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Abstract

The Autonomous and Resilient Management of All-source Sensors with Stable
Observability Monitoring (ARMAS-SOM) framework fuses collaborative all-source sensor
information in a resilient manner with fault detection, exclusion, and integrity solutions
recognizable to a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) user. This framework
uses a multi-filter residual monitoring approach for fault detection and exclusion which
is augmented with an additional “observability” Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) sublayer for resilience.

We monitor the a posteriori state covariances in this sub-layer

to provide intrinsic awareness when navigation state observability assumptions required
for integrity are in danger. The framework leverages this to selectively augment with
offboard information and preserve resilience. By maintaining split parallel collaborative
and instances of ARMAS-SOM and employing the “stingy collaboration” technique, we
are able maximize efficient use of network resources, limit the propagation of unknown
corruption to a single donor, and maintain consistent collaborative navigation without fear
of double-counting in a scalable processing footprint. Lastly, we preserve the ability to
return to autonomy and are able to use the same intrinsic awareness to notify the user when
it is safe to do so.
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AN ENHANCED FRAMEWORK FOR COLLABORATIVE ALL-SOURCE
NAVIGATION WITH INTEGRITY

I.

Introduction

With Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) navigation, simultaneously redundant, synchronous measurements with validated measurement models are readily available. In GNSS degraded and/or denied regions, none of these provisions are guaranteed.
All-source navigation fuses a variety of sensor measurements (visual, magnetic, signals
of opportunity, etc.) for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). Modern challenges
require all-source navigation systems to be resilient to various GNSS degradation, denial,
and spoofing techniques. In response to these challenges, collaboration allows all-source
navigation systems to improve resilience through cooperative information-sharing.
In February 2020, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 13905
“Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing Services” [1]. This “PNT EO” focused on national infrastructure concerns put
forth by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cyber and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA). The executive order directed research, development, and pilot
testing of additional robust and secure PNT services not dependent on GNSS to support
the National PNT Plan. The presented research directly supports the executive order by
demonstrating an enhanced framework for collaborative all-source navigation.
The first objective of the 2030 United States Air Force Science and Technology
Strategy is to “develop and deliver transformational strategic capabilities” [36]. In this
road map, the Air Force expressed a strategic challenge to obtain a mix of capable,
trustworthy, autonomous systems that can perform as part of a collaborative system to
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provide synergistic, multi-domain effects. With this in mind, this research presents methods
for real-time autonomous guidance for single and multi-vehicle cooperative navigation
in GNSS-denied environments. The unifying goal of these pursuits is to increase the
reliability and trustworthiness of collaborative PNT for critical domestic infrastructure and
defense capabilities.
1.1

Summary of Related Research
1.1.1

Vehicle Guidance for Self-Localization.

In GNSS degraded and/or denied regions, vehicles equipped with range or bearing
sensors can self-localize via surveillance network multilateration to anchor vehicles,
commonly known as “relative navigation”. Previous approaches to this problem relied on
CPU-intensive global optimization of the Cramer-Rao bound. As Chapter 3 mentions, the
computation required to perform this search grows exponentially with search area, making
it intractable for real-time trajectory guidance. There are diminishing returns associated
with calculating a global optimum for self-localization and a scalable, locally-optimized
technique is required.
1.1.2

Cooperative Navigation Support.

Navigation support vehicles can be used to provide persistent autonomous multilateration for nearby vehicles tasked with missions. Given sensor payload, fuel, and cost
constraints associated with small Unmanned Airborne System (sUAS), it is desirable to
federate costly all-source sensor payloads from mission payloads, especially if the mission
vehicles are considered attritable. As Chapter 4 mentions, real-time swarm control requires a scalable processing and communications footprint to enable real-time distributed
decision-making. Since navigation support requires swarm vehicles to expend physical resources to maneuver, there is an additional desire to allocate prioritized navigation support
for important mission vehicles.
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1.1.3

Observability Monitoring.

Autonomous and Resilient Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS) is an allsource navigation framework [43] which assumes overlapping state observability to detect
anomalous sensor behavior and exclude faulty sensors. ARMAS does not provide an
intrinsic means to assess this requirement. Unlike GNSS, it is common for all-source
sensors to encounter featureless measurement “deserts” which can cause loss of navigation
state observability.

The ARMAS framework monitors Kalman pre-update residuals

between sensor measurements and subfilter estimates to continuously judge whether sensor
measurements adhered to the distribution prescribed by the sensor model. Anomalous
sensor behaviors (e.g. bias, gain, model mismatch, high noise, etc.) are only observable
if there are other sensors with comparable observability into the state estimates.

If

anomalous behavior is detected, the ARMAS framework attempts to recover the sensor
through recalibration, remodeling, and re-validation. Chapter 5 demonstrates that it is
impossible for ARMAS to determine if a sensor is misbehaving or if it can be re-validated
if overlapping state observability is lost. A method to establish intrinsic information
awareness is required to provide a warning when fundamental observability assumptions
are in danger. This warning should be used to provide a timely indication to perform
collaborative augmentation before fundamental framework assumptions are violated.
1.1.4

Collaborative Navigation.

Collaborative navigation can result in dependency between state estimates and
measurements.

If a relative measurement is later re-used without taking historical

dependencies into account, this can result in double-counting.

Distributed networks

are scalable and resilient to changes in topology but are particularly vulnerable to this
problem. If dependencies are not properly managed, the estimator can become inconsistent
by overestimating available sensor information and eventually diverge. Since estimator
corruption is always discovered after the fault occurs, it is important to employ a scalable
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architecture in a manner which facilitates the recovery of consistency after collaborative
fusion occurs. As mentioned in Chapter 6, existing collaborative navigation techniques
either prevent the recovery of previously fused information or are impractical due to lack of
scalability resulting from processing and communications overhead. A scalable framework
which can correctly fuse collaborative information and recover estimator consistency postfault is required.
1.2

Research Contributions
We have defined the research problem of real-time autonomous vehicle guidance for

both self-localization and cooperative offboard navigation support. Several gaps in this
field have been identified which are addressed through demonstrations of scalable distributed control schemes. We have identified a critical intrinsic observability monitoring
feature missing from the ARMAS framework. This research addresses this problem with
a novel navigation state observability monitoring technique which seamlessly integrates
with ARMAS and is able to assess current vulnerability in the event of an unknown sensor
failure. We have defined the collaborative all-source navigation problem and identified specific gaps in this field of research. This dissertation addresses these gaps with an enhanced
3-D demonstration of a novel selective “stingy” collaborative framework which provides
intrinsic awareness to augment with offboard information, maintains consistent resilient
all-source navigation, and preserves the ability to gracefully recover autonomy.

The following list enumerates the contributions of this research (categorized by topic):
1. Single-Vehicle Trajectory Optimization for Self-Localization
I Introduces a novel locally-optimized technique with a scalable footprint for
real-time vehicle guidance.
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II Demonstrates that self-localization RMSE is reduced by 17% when compared
to formation flight.
III Demonstrates the optimized error distribution approaches Normality (Nonoptimized position RMSE is highly skewed).
2. Swarm Control for Autonomous Navigation Support
I Proves distributed local optimization of a globally convex cost surface can result
in consensus-like behavior.
II Demonstrates novel real-time swarm guidance for weighted offboard navigation
support.
III Demonstrates a novel scalable, real-time swarm guidance technique in large
swarms with 50 or more agents.
IV Demonstrates a 36% reduction in supported vehicle position RMSE for
optimized navigation support versus non-supported formation flight.
V Demonstrates prioritized mission vehicle position RMSE distributions approach
Normality (non-supported vehicle position RMSE is highly skewed).
3. Stable Observability Monitoring for Intrinsic Navigation State Awareness
I Provides a novel 3-D position state observability margin, a critical missing
component of ARMAS.
II Demonstrates a novel method to detect when overlapping state observability is
threatened.
III Demonstrates seamless ARMAS integration in a 3-D GNSS simulation
environment.
IV Provides a timely warning to augment ARMAS with additional sensor data.
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V Demonstrates reduced estimation error, preservation of fault detection and
exclusion consistency, and timely intrinsic information awareness versus to
legacy ARMAS.
4. A Resilient Collaborative All-source Navigation Framework with Integrity
I Demonstrates a novel resilient collaborative 3-D all-source navigation framework.
II Demonstrates resilience to inconsistency resulting from onboard corruption,
offboard corruption, or cross-correlation.
III Demonstrates a novel scalable “stingy collaboration” architecture to fuse
collaborative information in a manner which facilitates the recovery of
consistency after fault detection.
IV Preserves the ability to gracefully recover autonomy and understand when it is
safe to do so.
V Demonstrates reduced estimation error, increased navigation resilience, and
preservation of all-source integrity when compared to legacy ARMAS in a
realistic 3-D GNSS denial/spoofing scenario.
1.3

Outline
This dissertation is organized into six additional chapters.

Chapter 2 contains

mathematical notation, background, and a brief history of all-source navigation required
to describe the collaborative all-source navigation problem. The ARMAS navigation
framework [43] and Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring (SAARM) algorithm
[44] are summarized. Next, an overview of stochastic observability methods is provided in
context of navigation position state analysis. This section concludes with a brief summary
of current cross-correlation management techniques and estimator credibility analysis
methods which are used to support fusion of off-board collaborative sensor information.
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Chapters 3 through 6 contain background, simulation methodology, results, and
conclusions for the individual subset of topics contained in each. Chapter 3 contributes
a real-time heuristic method of trajectory generation Self-Aligning Swarm (SAS) for
a single aircraft to minimize relative positioning error in a wireless sensor network
composed of a simulated formation of maneuvering aircraft. This control scheme, SAS,
is based on a compact, scalable particle swarm to locally optimize Fisher Information
in real-time. Chapter 4 presents a distributed real-time autonomous navigation control
scheme with the introduction of the Swarm Control for Autonomous Navigation Support
(SCANS) algorithm.

SCANS is a real-time distributed swarm control scheme for

autonomous navigation support vehicles operating in a distributed surveillance network
to optimize multilateration for a set of non-cooperative maneuvering offboard mission
vehicles. This effort builds on the concept of local optimization of globally convex cost
surfaces (introduced in Chapter 3) to demonstrate prioritized consensus-like multilateration
optimization for non-cooperative mission aircraft in a surveillance network.
Chapter 5 contributes the definition and assessment of a position state observability
margin which provides intrinsic navigation state awareness. If this margin is threatened,
a warning can be issued to proactively augment navigation state observability with
collaborative support from nearby members in a distributed wireless network. The intrinsic
navigation state awareness indicates when collaborative information links are no longer
required to maintain resilience. Chapter 6 introduces a framework which builds on the fault
detection and exclusion, online calibration, and remodeling of ARMAS using observability
monitoring described in Chapter 5.

A novel “stingy” cross-correlation management

method is introduced to provide scalable resilient collaborative all-source navigation with
the option to return to autonomy.

Chapter 7 summarizes the entire research effort,

major contributions, and provides guidelines to consider when constructing a resilient
collaborative navigation framework.
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II.

Background

This chapter summarizes relevant methods and concepts required to tackle the
collaborative all-source navigation problem. The chapter begins by establishing notation
conventions and reference frames used throughout our research. Next, summaries of
recursive Bayesian estimation, residual monitoring, inertial navigation, and all-source
navigation are provided to motivate our proposed efforts. Next, the resilient all-source
ARMAS navigation framework and SAARM algorithms, which underpin this effort, are
discussed. An overview of stochastic observability methods is discussed in the context
of navigation position state analysis. Next, we analyze several current cross-correlation
management techniques which can be used to support fusion of off-board collaborative
sensor information.
2.1

Notation Conventions

Scalars: Scalars are represented with lower and uppercase characters in italics, e.g., A or
a.
Vectors: Vectors are indicated by bold lowercase characters e.g., v or by a single underbar
e.g., B. By default, these are assumed to be column vectors.
¯
Vector Component: The scalar component of a vector is indicated with a subscript, e.g.,
the ith entry in the vector v is represented by vi .
Vector Subscripts: A vector annotated with a subscript (e.g., vi ) indicates the discrete
time i sample of the vector v and is used predominantly within recursive estimation.
A Priori and A Posteriori Estimates: When discussing recursive estimators, like a Kalman
filter, it is important to distinguish between a pre-update or “a priori” estimate and a
post-update or “a posteriori” estimate, e.g., x̂−i or x̂+i .
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Matrices: Matrices are indicated by bold uppercase characters, e.g. B or by double
underbar e.g., B.
¯¯
Transpose: The superscript xT indicates the transpose of x.
Identity and Zero: The matrix I is the identity matrix. If not otherwise explained, the
dimensions of this matrix will be identified with a subscript.
Estimated Variable: To indicate an estimated quantity or variable, the circumflex or “hat”
accent, e.g., v̂ is used.
Statistical Notation: The expected value is represented by E [x].

The statistical

distribution of a random variable is denoted via ,→. For example, if a random vector
v at time i follows a Normal distribution with mean µi and covariance matrix Σi , it is
represented by vi ,→ N(µi , Σi ).
Reference Frames: If a vector exists in a certain navigation reference frame, it is indicated
with a superscript, e.g., vi is a vector in the i-frame.
Direction Cosine Matrices: A DCM indicating a transformation from i to frame e is
represented by Cei . (e.g. a vector ve , in the e-frame, may be obtained by the
transformation ve = Cei vi ).
2.1.1

Reference Frames.

A vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude must be expressed in terms of a reference
frame. A comprehensive explanation of navigation reference frames and their utility is
provided by [75]. This section briefly summarizes the navigation reference frames required
for this research.
True inertial frame (I-frame) - a theoretical non-rotating reference frame governed by
Newton’s laws of motion with no predefined origin or orientation.
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Earth-centered inertial frame (i-frame) - a non-rotating orthonormal reference frame
with origin at the Earth’s center of mass. The x − y plane is collocated with the
Equatorial plane with the +x axis pointing toward the vernal equinox. The z − axis is
aligned with the Earth’s poles with the +z axis pointing towards the North Pole. For
terrestrial navigation purposes, this is considered an inertial reference frame.
Earth-centered Earth-fixed frame (e-frame) - a rotating orthonormal reference frame
attached directly to the Earth. The x − y plane is collocated with the Equatorial
plane with the +x axis pointing towards the Prime Meridian and +y axis pointing
towards 90◦ East longitude.
Earth-fixed navigation frame (n-frame) - an orthonormal reference frame with an origin
typically defined near the surface of the Earth, also known as North-East-Down. The
+x direction points North, the +y direction points East, and the +z direction points
Down (direction of acceleration due to Earth’s gravity) with respect to the origin.
This reference frame is rigidly fixed to the Earth’s surface and can be useful for local
estimation.
Aircraft body frame (b-frame) - an orthonormal reference frame with its origin fixed at
the aircraft’s center of mass (Fig 2.2). The +x, +y, and +z axes point out the nose,
right wing, and bottom of the aircraft. A strapdown inertial navigation system is
typically rigidly attached to the aircraft body frame.
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Figure 2.1: Earth-Centered Inertial, Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed, and Earth-Fixed reference
frames [24]
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Figure 2.2: Aircraft Body reference frame (b-frame) [24]

2.2

The All-Source Navigation Problem
The model estimation notation and reference frame summary compiled in the

previous sections provide tools to approach the all-source navigation problem. When
applied to airborne vehicles, this discussion often involves computations across multiple
reference frames to accurately estimate position, velocity, and attitude in real-time. With
GNSS navigation, simultaneously redundant, synchronous measurements with validated
measurement models are readily available. In the case of all-source navigation, none of
these are guaranteed. The following subsections describe the build-up from classical model
estimation to Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) based on residual monitoring. This
section concludes with a brief evolution of inertial, GNSS, and all-source navigation to
provide context for the proposed research.
2.2.1

Recursive Bayesian Estimation.

Navigation is based on accurate estimation of a vehicle’s system states. This is
accomplished via a task called model estimation. Modern navigation, based on recursive
model estimation, can trace its roots to the Kalman Filter (KF) algorithm [45], presented
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in 1960. In a Kalman filter, the system states, x, are estimated recursively in real-time by
propagating a state estimate, x̂, and associated state covariance, P. The process (dynamics)
model is given by
ẋ(t) = Fx(t) + Bu(t) + Gw(t),

(2.1)

E[w(t)] = 0,

(2.2)

E[w(t)w(t)T (t + τ] = Qδ(τ),

(2.3)

with

where x is the system state vector, u is the system input control vector, and w is a vector
of white noise components. F, B, and G are linear operator matrices for the state vector,
control input vector, and noise vector, respectively. The expectation operator is given by E,
time is given by t, Q is the process noise strength, and δ(τ) is the dirac function.
In 1978, the Van Loan method was introduced [76] to provide a method to discretize
2.1 and 2.3 for use in digital, time-sampled computer systems. The resulting discrete
process noise strength matrix, Qd , discrete control input matrix, Bd , and discrete state
transition matrix, Φ, are calculated by linearizing the system about a single time sample,
∆t.
Assuming state estimate observability, measurements, z, and associated measurement
covariances, R, are used to perform a state estimate update. The measurements are mapped
to the states by the observation model, H. The discrete measurement model is given by
zk = Hxk + vk

(2.4)

E[vk ] = 0,

(2.5)

E[vk vTk+∆t ] = Rδk,k+∆t ,

(2.6)

where

z is the sensor measurement vector, k is the discrete sample index, and v is the discrete-time
measurement noise instance.
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The discrete Kalman filter is initialized with state estimates, x0 , and associated initial
state covariance P0 . The initial state estimate of x̂ is propagated in the discrete Kalman
filter using
x̂−k+1 = Φx̂+k + Bd uk ,

(2.7)

P−k+1 = ΦP+k ΦT + Qd .

(2.8)

This update is performed by optimally combining the stochastic components of the
state estimate and of the measurements via the Kalman gain, K, using
Kk = P−k HT [HPk HT + R]−1 ,

(2.9)

x̂+k = x̂−k + Kk [zk − Hx̂−k ],

(2.10)

P+k = (I − Kk H)P−k .

(2.11)

With properly modeled state-transition and measurement models, the result is optimal
stochastic estimation of the vehicle states.

The state-transition model makes use of

mathematical relationships between system states to provide additional observability to
states which cannot be directly measured. Recursive estimation is the primary means of
model estimation used by this research to approach the all-source navigation problem.
2.2.2

Basic Residual Monitoring.

This brief overview of residual monitoring based on a likelihood function for a Kalman
filter or EKF is based on a more thorough introduction [56]. Residual monitoring is a useful
technique for sensor fault detection. The goal of this section is to set the stage for a later
explanation of the SAARM algorithm implemented by the ARMAS framework.
After a sensor measurement z is performed, it is possible to extract a set of KF
residuals, r, at time k, resulting in
rk = zk − Hx̂−k .
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(2.12)

If we apply Gaussian white-noise assumptions, the expected statistical distribution of these
residuals is


rk ,→ N 0, HP−k HT + R ,

(2.13)

which results in a Gaussian-Normal probability density function given by
p(rk |Σk ) = √

1
1
T −1
e− 2 (rk ) Σk (rk ) and
|2πΣk |

Σk = HP−k HT + R.

(2.14)
(2.15)

If we assume a set of N residuals have been collected preceding tk , the resulting likelihood
function is given by
L Nk =

k
Y

1
p

j=k−N+1

|2πΣ j |

e− 2 (r j )
1

T −1
Σj

(r j ) .

(2.16)

In lieu of differentiation, this expression can be simplified by taking advantage of
the monotonically increasing natural logarithm function, resulting in the log-likelihood
function given by
L Nk =

k
X

1
− log(|2πΣ j |) − rTj Σ−1
j r j.
2
j=k−N+1

(2.17)

If we examine a residual vector rk containing the N most recent residuals, the log-likelihood
function acts as a moving window to compile the cumulative statistical likelihood for this
set. A predefined threshold can be used to determine if the set of residuals falls outside the
expected distribution which would trigger a failure detection. This forms the basis for the
fault detection and exclusion algorithm espoused by ARMAS.
2.2.3

Inertial Navigation.

The Inertial Navigation System (INS) was first developed as a guidance system for
early ballistic missiles in the 1940s [68]. Engineers determined that, with a known
starting point, it is possible measure and integrate small changes in velocity and rotation to
maintain an estimate of a vehicle’s location, velocity, and attitude. These measurements
15

are performed by accelerometers and gyroscopes inside an Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU). The gyroscopes sense rotation rates in the true inertial I-frame. Small errors in
these measurements accumulate over time to form an integration bias or “drift”. These
measurement errors constitute the primary error source for inertial navigation. Effects from
small rotations of the body frame when traversing over the curvature of the Earth can be
measured, resulting in a periodic perturbation known as a Schuler cycle [69]. A computer
is often used to keep track of the IMU measurements, resulting in the modern version
of INS. The two general categories of INS are strategic-grade “platform” and tactical or
Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) grade “strapdown” types [75]. A platform
INS is a large, expensive, fully gimbaled unit and is designed to maintain a rigid gyroscopic
reference with respect to the direction of Earth’s gravity. At any time, a vehicle’s current
attitude can be directly measured from the platform INS. A strapdown unit is smaller
with few (if any) moving parts. Hence its name, the strapdown INS is rigidly mounted
to the vehicle and operates in the b-frame. The strapdown unit is typically designed with
orthogonally-mounted gyroscopes that can measure changes in roll, pitch, and yaw. A
computer with a high sample rate is required to measure and integrate changes in vehicle
attitude with respect to the I-frame and measure specific forces aligned with the principal
axes of the b-frame. Modern MEMS-grade INS are inexpensive, smaller than 1 cm3 , and
are often used to aide sUAS [29] [10].
2.2.4

All-Source Navigation.

As mentioned in the previous section, small cumulative measurement errors form an
integration bias or “drift”, the primary error source for an INS. Some form of recursive
model estimation, like an EKF, is often used to maintain an INS error model and incorporate
trusted external geodetic measurements to periodically correct integration bias. In the
early 1970s, the Department of Defense initiated a joint program called Global Positioning
System (GPS) with a clearly-stated functional baseline which resulted in a constellation of
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24 satellites in spatially-separated orbits to maintain assured PNT coverage for an unlimited
number of concurrent users [11]. GPS provides a set of trusted absolute geodetic reference
measurements and can be used to counter accumulated INS integration bias. Over the next
20 years, GPS became ubiquitous for both military and civilian use. By the 1990s, accurate
and available GPS was a common assumption. Civilian GPS accuracy was improved with
the removal of selective availability in 2000 [11]. Over this period, there was significant
motivation for coupled GPS/INS navigation research [16][72] [64][28]. Consequently,
efforts in non-GPS navigation methods were often relegated into the alternative navigation
category, mainly suitable for environments where GPS was unavailable such as underwater
or indoors [66] [54]. Around the same time, localized GPS denial via noise jammers began
to proliferate. Additionally, the possibility of advanced GPS emulation or “spoofing”
was recognized [17][61][58]. In response, NATO coined the term Navigation Warfare
(NAVWAR) as a method to prevent the hostile use of PNT information while protecting
unimpeded use of this information for allied forces. Under this paradigm, GPS signals can
no longer be assumed as an available or trusted source [61]. In 2010, DARPA responded to
this with the announcement of the All Source Positioning and Navigation (ASPN) program
[74]. The ANT Center at AFIT embraced all-source navigation as a means to address
NAVWAR by combining all available sensor information for PNT [23]. Since 2005, there
has been significant research in alternative navigation technologies such as Visual [77],
Signals of Opportunity [20], Magnetic [13], and others [23][63][22]. In 2018, ARMAS [43]
was introduced to provide a generalized framework for resilient management of all-source
sensors which leveraged SCORPION pluggable Bayesian estimators to gracefully manage
multiple concurrent state estimation subfilters [46]. In 2019, the monitoring mode of the
ARMAS framework was redesigned to provide a means for all-source integrity, known as
SAARM [44]. The following sections summarize the contributions of both ARMAS and
SAARM and highlight motivations for collaborative all-source navigation with integrity.
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2.3

Autonomous Resilient Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS)
Introduced in 2018, ARMAS provides a generalized framework for real-time

management of heterogeneous, asynchronous all-source sensors [43]. This framework
is resilient to corruption from mismodeled, uncalibrated, and faulty sensors and is
accomplished by combining sensor validation, FDE, recalibration, and remodeling modes
in a single architecture. ARMAS employs a set of SCORPION pluggable EKF estimators
to address the following nonlinear navigation problem:
ẋ(t) = f [x(t), (t), u(t), t] + G(t)w(t)

(2.18)

where x is a N × 1 state vector of a vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude. The
measurement error states vector  is of dimension M × 1, u is the control input vector,
G is an (N + M) × W linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white noise process defined by a
W × W continuous process noise strength matrix, Q.
The state estimates are propagated through optimally combining the state process
model, sensor-specific calibration parameters, and measurement updates from j = 1...J
available all-source sensors. The measurement model for the jth sensor is described by:


z[kj] = h[ j] x(t),  [ j] (t), u(t), t, p[ j] + v[kj] ,

(2.19)

where k is the discrete time index, t is continuous time, h[ j] is the nonlinear measurement
function for the jth sensor,  [ j] is an L × 1 subset of  which contains additional error states
needed to process sensor measurements, p[j] is a P × 1 user-selectable model parameter
vector for h[ j] , and vk is a Z ×1 discrete white noise process resulting from the measurement
noise Q with covariance defined by matrix R[j]
k .
The Z × 1 measurement residual for sensor j, r[j]
k is defined by


r[kj] = z[kj] − h[ j] x̂−k , ˆk[ j]− , uk , tk , p̂[kj] ,
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(2.20)

where x̂−k , ˆk[ j]− , and p̂[kj] are estimated quantities. Assuming white Gaussian noise, the
measurement residual from 2.20 is expected to follow the distribution


r[kj] ,→ N 0N×1 , S[kj] ,
T

S[kj] = H[kj] P−k H[kj] + R[kj] ,

(2.21)
(2.22)

where P−k is the (N + M) × (N + M) state estimate error covariance matrix at time tk and
T

H[kj] is the Z × (N + M) Jacobian matrix of h[ j] .
Sensors are initialized in one of two modes: trusted or untrusted. Untrusted sensors
are required to enter a sensor validation mode prior to being brought into monitoring mode.
In validation mode, ARMAS employs a likelihood function described by (2.17) to monitor
the statistical distribution of a user-defined monitoring period composed of recent Kalman
pre-update residuals. A Chi-square, χ∗ , test statistic is used to detect excursions outside a
user-defined threshold across the sampling period. Sensors in validation mode are excluded
from impacting the main state estimates. Trusted sensors are directly brought online into
monitoring mode. In monitoring mode, sensor measurements are allowed to update the
main state estimates. ARMAS employs the same pre-update residual likelihood function
used in the validation mode to monitor sensor performance. A detailed explanation of
monitoring mode, including FDE and integrity functions is given in Section 2.3.1.
Once a fault is detected, the sensor is no longer “trusted” and is quarantined from
affecting the core navigation state estimate, x̂[ j] . ARMAS attempts to reinitialize the sensor
via validation mode. If this fails, ARMAS attempts to repair and recover the faulty sensor
via two separate modes: sensor calibration and remodeling.
In calibration mode, user-selectable sensor parameters, p[ j] and/or  [ j] are estimated
using residual monitoring from trusted sensors that have observability of x. If there is
a single calibration parameter, ARMAS attempts to correct the calibration using residual
monitoring and sends the sensor back to validation mode. If linked extrinsic calibration
parameters exist, (e.g. camera lever arm and camera orientation within p[ j] or  [ j] ), these
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are estimated individually and sequenced based on convergence of the state covariance
matrix to maintain state observability.
If the recalibrated sensor fails to pass sensor validation, the sensor enters remodeling
mode where ARMAS attempts to modify the measurement model, h[ j] , based on 1...S
user-defined measurement models. S concurrent filters are spawned (each with a unique
measurement model), and an epoch of measurement residuals is gathered against the core
navigation estimate x. The ‘winning’ sensor measurement model is selected based on
which filter best matches the prescribed distribution (2.21) during the residual epoch. The
sensor then enters validation mode. If the remodeling mode does not result in a new model
selection, and Resilient Sensor Recovery (RSR) is activated, the sensor periodically reenters validation mode after a user-selectable time period in an attempt to overcome a
temporal anomaly. Figure 2.3 is a state transition diagram depiction of these modes. The
result is a framework compatible with heterogeneous, asynchronous all-source sensors with
the benefits of resilience against various sensor calibration, modeling, and temporal faults.
One assumption that is not explicitly discussed in [43] is that ARMAS requires
overlapping state observability [31] to detect anomalous sensor behavior. As discussed
above, the system monitors Kalman pre-update residuals between sensor measurements
and subfilter estimates to continuously judge whether sensor measurements adhered to the
distribution prescribed by the sensor model. Anomalous sensor behaviors (e.g. bias, gain,
model mismatch, high noise, etc.) are only observable if there are other sensors with
comparable observability into the state estimate. If anomalous behavior is detected, the
ARMAS framework attempts to recover the sensor through recalibration, remodeling, and
re-validation. Without overlapping state observability, it is impossible to determine if a
sensor is misbehaving or if it can be re-validated.
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Figure 2.3: ARMAS Framework State Diagram [43]
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2.3.1

Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring (SAARM) .

As previously alluded, the monitoring mode in ARMAS was redesigned in 2019 with
a special form of residual monitoring. SAARM is designed to detect multiple sensor
failure modes: bias, mismatched model, and/or miscalibration. For resilience to a single
faulty sensor, this approach requires the designer to maintain J = I differently configured
navigation subfilters (one for each sensor). This is later extended to provide resiliency to
multiple simultaneous faults (at the expense of processing power). The key to SAARM’s
FDE and integrity functions is the use of overlapping state observability to detect a faulty
sensor. The pluggable Bayesian filters provided by the SCORPION estimation architecture
afford needed flexibility to spawn, propagate, and remove multiple concurrent filters on
the fly. The following section summarizes SAARM’s fault detection, fault exclusion, and
all-source integrity methods.
SAARM assumes a system form of
ẋ(t) = f [x(t), (t), u(t), t] + G(t)w(t)

(2.23)

where x is a N × 1 state vector of a vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude. The
measurement error states vector  is of dimension M × 1, u is the control input vector,
G is an (N + M) × W linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white noise process defined by
a W × W continuous process noise strength matrix, Q. SAARM estimates system states
with J separate subfilters. At time t = tk , the system state vector and state estimation
covariance matrix are defined by x̂[ j] (tk ) and P[x̂x̂j] (tk ) for j = 1...J separate subfilters. Each
of these subfilters is informed by a subset of I − 1 sensors. At t = tk , the ith sensor provides
measurements given by


z[i] (tk ) = h[i] x̂[ j] (tk− ), u(tk ), tk

(2.24)

where h[i] is the nonlinear measurement function, u(tk ) is the control input function, and
v[i] (tk ) is a discrete white noise process of dimension Zi × 1 defined by covariance matrix
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R[i] (tk ). The pre-update measurement estimate for sensor i from filter j is defined by


ẑ[i, j] (tk ) = h[i] x̂[ j] (tk− ), u(tk ), tk ,

(2.25)

where the estimated covariance matrix is defined by
Pẑẑ [i, j] (tk− ) = H[i] (tk− )Px̂x̂ [ j] (tk− )H[i] (tk− )T .

(2.26)

Using (2.25) and (2.26), the “pre-update residual” vector between sensor i and filter j, r[i, j]
j]
and its covariance matrix, P[i,
rr are defined as

r[i, j] (tk ) = z[i] (tk ) − ẑ[i, j] (tk− ),

(2.27)

[i, j] −
j]
[i]
P[i,
rr (tk ) = R (tk ) + Pẑẑ (tk ).

(2.28)

Fault detection relies on computing a moving average of recent residual-space test statistics
formed by pre-update residual vectors from (2.27) and (2.28). ARMAS is designed to
detect three categories of faults: (1) a bias, (2) an incorrectly stated noise covariance, or
(3) an incorrectly stated measurement model. The likelihood function focuses on a single
residual-space statistic derived from the Mahalanobis distance, d, given by
d2 = (y − µ)T Σ−1 (y − µ),

(2.29)

where µ and Σ are the mean and covariance of a Zi -dimensional Gaussian distribution. It is
known that a sum of M independent d2 distances follows a χ∗ distribution with M degrees
of freedom [21] given by
χ =
∗

k+M
X

d2 (t s ),

(2.30)

s=k

d2 (tk ) = rT (tk )[Prr (tk )]−1 r(tk ).

(2.31)

The set of pre-update residuals is known to be a zero-mean, white sequence [56]. The fault
detection test for M pre-residuals is composed of the following hypotheses:
H0 : χ∗[i, j] < χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi )
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(2.32)

H1 : χ∗[i, j] > χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi )

(2.33)

where α is the probablity of false alarm and M is the number of averaged pre-residual
samples. H0 refers to the hypothesis where the fault is not present in filter j. H1 refers to
the hypothesis where a fault is present in filter j. The resulting hypothesis test forms the
basis of the fault detection algorithm.
Once a fault is detected, a consensus of multiple subfilters is utilized to exclude the
faulty sensor. With J = I subfilters, SAARM can only exclude single faults within each
residual monitoring epoch (i.e. M-sample moving average). In this scenario, each subfilter
is informed by a different subset of I − 1 sensors (i.e. each subfilter is missing a single
sensor). SAARM also assumes that all states are observable by all subfilters. In addition
to J = I subfilters, a main filter is maintained to generate a full navigation state estimate
for user output. Accordingly, cross-covariance terms between the main filter and any other
filters are not used for any computation. For this scenario, SAARM provides an axiom for
fault exclusion: under the assumption that, at most, one sensor can fail simultaneously, at
least one of the J subfilters will be completely unaffected by faulty measurements [43].
The fault consensus is tallied in a T-matrix of dimension I × J and uses the following
convention:






0, Sensor i not associated with filter j







T(i, j) = 
0, χ∗[i, j] < χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi ), No Fault Detected, H0










1, χ∗[i, j] > χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi ), Fault Detected, H1
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between I sensors and J subfilters required for “fault
consensus“ sensor exclusion. The rows correspond to the i = 1...I sensors and the columns
correspond to the j = 1...J subfilters. Each row contains measurements, Z[i] , and the
measurement error covariance matrix, R[i] , from the ith sensor. Each column contains the
estimated measurement, ẑ[i, j] , and its error covariance matrix, Pẑẑ [i, j] .
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Based on the stated convention, a fault is declared when T contains a single nonzero
entry (i.e. at least one subfilter detected H1 ). After a fault is declared, SAARM waits for
a consensus from the remaining subfilters until a single fault-free subfilter remains. It is
assumed that the last remaining fault-free subfilter is the one which does not contain the
faulty sensor. After fault exclusion, the fault-free subfilter is elevated to “main filter” status
and the pre-update residual monitoring epoch is restarted with I − 1 total sensors and J − 1
subfilters. Each newly spawned subfilter now contains I − 2 sensors. The faulty sensor
is removed from monitoring mode and follows the state diagram shown in Figure 2.3. Of
note, SAARM is able to detect the occurrence of multiple simultaneous faults but is not
able to provide simultaneous fault exclusion with the minimum quantity of I = J subfilters.
For SAARM to properly handle multiple simultaneous faults, multiple layers of
subfilters are required. The number of concurrent subfilters, JN , required to handle N
simultaneous faults for I sensors is:
!
I
I!
JN =
=
.
N!(I − N)!
I−N

(2.34)

As one might expect, the subfilter (and processing) requirements to guarantee resiliency to
multiple faults is non-trivial. For example, an 8 sensor system resilient to 2 simultaneous
faults (occuring within the same pre-residual monitoring epoch) requires 28 concurrent
SAARM subfilters!
As a result of the uncorrupted subfilter guarantee provided by the ARMAS framework
for a single simultaneous fault, SAARM is able to provide a similar guarantee for all-source
position integrity. The previously stated fault exclusion axiom is extended: assuming at
least one of the subfilters is informed entirely by properly modeled, uncorrupted sensors,
then at least one subfilter contains consistent state estimation error statistics [44]. This
means that the probabilistic union of the position covariance estimates of all subfilters
contains the true navigation state within the statistical significance of the fault detection
tests. Figure 2.5 shows a visualization of SAARM all-source horizontal position integrity
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Figure 2.4: SAARM T-Matrix for i = 1...I All-Source Sensors [44]
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recovery after a single sensor fault. The union of position error covariance ellipses for the
remaining J − 1 = 4 subfilters is shown with a green border.
In summary, SAARM provides all-source sensor FDE and integrity for three different
types of serial sensor faults. To provide resiliency to a single fault, ARMAS is required to
instantiate and maintain a quantity of subfilters equal to the quantity of all-source sensors.
A separate main filter is maintained strictly for user output. Fault identification is based on
a sequence of χ∗ statistical tests of pre-update measurement residuals. Fault exclusion is
based on a subfilter consensus approach which is tallied in a novel T matrix. A technique is
introduced to provide resiliency to multiple simultaneous faults at the expense of factorial
growth in the required quantity of concurrent estimation filters. Lastly, SAARM provides
a method for all-source position integrity via the union of all subfilter position covariance
estimates. This integrity concept is based on the assumption that the framework is able to
maintain at least one uncorrupted subfilter.
2.4

Observability Assessment Methods
The previous section summarized the SAARM algorithm used to perform fault

detection, exclusion, and integrity functions within the ARMAS framework.

The

framework requires overlapping state observability to perform each of these functions. As
previously stated, the framework’s basic goal is to maintain at least one subfilter which
is never corrupted by a faulty sensor. This is required to maintain navigation estimation
consistency and provide a method for all-source integrity. To ensure this assumption is not
violated, we believe the designer should continuously monitor overlapping observability
in every ARMAS subfilter.

The following sections summarize general eigenvalue

decomposition and normalization for the error covariance matrix, P, and a subsequent
degree of observability method designed to numerically assess specific state observability
within a nonlinear system.
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Figure 2.5: SAARM All-Source Horizontal Position Integrity (SCORPION Pluggable
EKF)
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2.4.1

Eigenvalue Normalization for the Error Covariance Matrix.

In 1983, a general method for eigenvalue normalization of the state estimate error
covariance matrix, P, was introduced [31]. This method set a bound on the eigenvalues
and forced them to be dimensionless. Both of these attributes facilitate interpretation of
state estimate observability. The pre-update error covariance matrix, P− (tk ), is assumed
to be positive definite. The post update error covariance, P+ (tk ) is normalized using the
congruent transformation (2.35):
P+norm (tk ) =
where


p
p
P− (tk )−1 P+ (tk ) P− (tk )−1

(2.35)

√
P is the element-wise square root of the diagonal terms of the symmetric matrix

P. The largest eigenvalue of P+ (tk ) indicates the variance of the state(s) that are least
observable and the rest of the eigenvalues are normalized based on this value. Expectedly,
the states with the smallest eigenvalues indicate higher observability. The sum of the
eigenvalues in the normalized post update error covariance matrix, P+norm (tk ), are forced


to be equal to trace P+norm (tk ) . This is performed so the eigenvalues could easily be scaled
to the order of the system, n, via (2.36)
P+norm (tk ) =

n
P+ (tk ).
trace(P+ (tk ))

(2.36)

This basic normalization method provides a convenient way to assess the degree of
observability across all system states. Since all-source sensors are likely heterogeneous
and/or asynchronous, this observability information is particularly important to assess FDE
and integrity performance within the ARMAS framework. The next subsection summarizes
a slightly more advanced method, which quantifies observability for a specific set of states
in a nonlinear system.
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2.4.2

Degree of Observability.

In 2017, a method to quantify the observability of specific state estimates in nonlinear
systems was developed [60]. Given a discrete, nonlinear system of the form
xk+1 = Φ(tk , xk )xk + G(tk , x x )wk ,

(2.37)

yk+1 = H(tk , xk )xk + vk+1 ,

(2.38)

the author assumes wk and vk are uncorrelated and composed of zero-mean, white Gaussian
noise components. It is shown that the measurement equation can be rewritten with the
observability matrix for this system given by
yk = Ok xk + vk .

(2.39)

The authors show that if the rank of Ok is equal to the number of states in the system, n,
then every system state is observable. In the fully observable case, the author shows that
Ok OTk is a square invertible matrix. For this case, the following relationship is examined
Ok yk = OTk Ok xk + OTk vk .
Since Ok is invertible, it is possible to solve for the state estimate

−1
xk = OTk Ok OTk (yk − vk ).
Once the state estimate is isolated, the matrix pseudoinverse can be recognized and is
replaced by the following expression:
ζk = O+k yk ,

(2.40)


−1
where O+k = OTk Ok OTk for simplification. The scalar form of the ith row of this matrix
for i = 1...n system states is described by
ζki = αi1 yk + αi2 yk+1 + ... + αin yk+n−1 ,
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where αin are in the ith component of the vector ζk . Similarly, the measurement equation in
scalar form is
υik = αi1 vk + αi2 vk+1 + ... + αin vk+n−1 ,
where αin are in the ith component of the vector υk . The variance of the ith component of
measurement noise is
Υik


 

i 2
i 2
i 2
i 2
= E (υk ) = (α1 ) + (α2 ) + ... + (αn ) rk

where rk = E[v2k ], the original system measurement noise variance. Finally, the degree of
observability is defined as





i 2
E (xk )
E
rk
.
DOO = 
 = 

i 2
i 2 Pn
i
i 2
E (ζk ) Υk E (ζk )
j=1 (α j )
(xik )2

(2.41)

Clearly, understanding the measurement noise, measurement model, and the observability matrix are key to assessing the observability of a system state variable. The degree
of observability is a scalar and is used to directly quantify the observability of a statevariable without eigenvalue decomposition. The computations required to solve for the
degree of observability are relatively straightforward in a Kalman filter algorithm. Since
SAARM framework assumes state observability for both FDE and integrity, it is critical
that a method for monitoring real-time position state observability is implemented.
2.5

Methods for Managing Cross-Correlated Information
If possible, a vehicle should maintain autonomous navigation using proprioceptive

(onboard) sensors.
observability.

Furthermore, the ARMAS framework requires overlapping state

If a vehicle cannot maintain proprioceptive overlapping observability,

collaborative navigation support can be used for augmentation. We must be careful
because fusing collaborative sensor data can result in dependency between state estimates
and measurements if a relative measurement is later re-used without taking historical
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dependencies into account. This problem is called double-counting [41]. Distributed
networks are scalable and resilient to changes in topology but are particularly vulnerable
to this problem. If dependencies are not properly managed, the estimator can become
inconsistent by overestimating available sensor information and eventually diverge. The
following section analyzes several methods to properly account for dependencies when
fusing measurements: Covariance Intersection, Conditional Naive Filter, Game-Theoretic
Filter, and the Interleaved Update Algorithm. These methods are simulated and assessed
based on position MSE and by using a numerical estimator credibility analysis. The
Interleaved Update Algorithm is recommended for the proposed research. This section
concludes with a method to maintain collaborative resiliency against simultaneous sensor
failures.
2.5.1

Covariance Intersection Method.

In [40], Julier proved that the Covariance Intersection (CI) method is guaranteed to
avoid the problem of double-counting for any choice of weight w in the interval [0, 1] which
guarantees estimator consistency. He admitted the CI method causes a loss in information
which results in suboptimal update for loosely correlated measurements.
If noise-corrupted observations are dependent on an estimator’s own system state,
then independence assumptions are violated. If ignored, these cross-correlations will cause
a naive recursive Bayesian estimator to overestimate the amount of information available
for an update. A rudementary fix for this problem involves increasing Bayesian estimator
process noise to account for unmodelled dependencies between measurements and the state
estimate. This strategy leads to increased state estimate covariance and degradation in
overall estimator performance.
The limitations of managing unknown cross-correlation between state estimates and
measurements in decentralized estimation with arbitrary network topologies are widely
known. It is possible to judiciously adjust Kalman filter tuning to mask the effects of
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unknown cross-correlations, but artificially increasing the process noise covariance matrix
is likely to cause filter divergence. This motivated the CI method introduced by [41] which
fuses the probability densities of two measurements with unknown cross-correlation into a
consistent covariance estimate. Per the author’s derivation, the two pieces of information,
A and B are combined to yield C. The sources are noise corrupted, so they become random
variables a, b, and c. The means of vectors a, b, and c are denoted as ā, b̄ and c̄. The error
terms are denoted as e
a = a − ā, e
b = b − b̄, and e
c = c − c̄. The mean squared error terms
(MSE) are

P̄aa = E[e
ae
aT ] P̄bb = E[e
be
bT ] P̄cc = E[e
ce
cT ]
and cross correlation term is
P̄ab = E[abT ].
The MSE terms are approximated by Paa and Pbb . P̄ab is assumed to be unknown.
Consistency is maintained i f f
Paa − P̄aa ≥ 0 and Pbb − P̄bb ≥ 0 and Pcc − P̄cc ≥ 0,
in accordance with the standard definition of consistency [41]. The CI algorithm is
described by (2.42) and (2.43)
−1
−1
P−1
cc = wPaa + (1 − w)Pbb ,

(2.42)

−1
−1
P−1
cc c̄ = wPaa ā + (1 − w)Pbb b̄.

(2.43)

In the CI algorithm, w ∈ [0, 1] and blends weighting between parameters ā and b̄. w
is selected to minimize the tr(Pcc ) or det(Pcc ), respectively. Minimization of the trace of
Pcc is equivalent to minimizing the primary dimensions of the Pcc error covariance ellipse.
Minimization of the determinant is equivalent to minimization of the area of the Pcc error
covariance ellipse. In [38], Hurley showed the minimization of det(Pcc ) is equivalent to
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minimization of the Shannon information of the fused probability density function. This
insight could be particularly useful if the probability density functions are something other
than Gaussian. The CI technique is recommended as a good estimator for highly crosscorrelated measurements.

Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show comparisons of the Naive Fusion, CI det(Pcc ) minimization,
and CI tr(Pcc ) minimization methods for 2 fused measurements, and 4 sequential fused
measurements, respectively. It is clear in both cases that NF method provides a much
tighter estimate of Pcc than the CI method. This is expected because the NF ignores the
cross-correlation terms Pab as shown in Equations 2.44 and 2.45. This causes the NF to
overestimate the available information.
−1
−1
P−1
cc = Paa + Pbb .

(2.44)

−1
−1
P−1
cc c̄ = Paa ā + Pbb b̄.

(2.45)

The CI method utilizes a conservative estimate of Pab to guarantee estimator
consistency. A downside of the CI method is the likelihood of underestimating available
information. The slight differences between the tr(Pcc ) and det(Pcc ) CI methods are visible
in Figure 2.7 with 4 fused measurements. It should be noted that a highly skewed ellipse
will render a small area. For this reason, we chose to implement the tr(Pcc ) CI method.
2.5.2

Ignore Cross-Correlation Technique (Conditional Naive Filter).

Motivated by potential improvement over the conservative CI method, [2] introduced
the idea of ignoring the cross-correlation terms under certain conditions while still
maintaining filter consistency. Assuming we have access to consistent estimates of e
Paa and
e
Pbb , a consistent estimate of e
Pcc can be obtained from Equation 2.44 under the following
conditions for P̄ab :
p
− Paa Pbb ≤ P̄ab ≤ 0, or
 P−1 P−1 −1
p
aa bb
≤ P̄ab ≤ Paa Pbb
2
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(2.46)
(2.47)

Figure 2.6: Comparison of Fused Error Covariance Ellipses Pcc resulting from CI tr(Pcc ) vs.
CI det(P xx ) vs. Naive Kalman Filter Method with 2 Cross-Correlated Range Measurements
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of Fused Error Covariance Ellipses Pcc resulting from CI tr(Pcc ) vs.
CI det(P xx ) vs. Naive Kalman Filter Method with 4 Cross-Correlated Range Measurements
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Although somewhat insightful, this method requires some knowledge of Pab to ensure
the inequalities defined in Equations 2.46 and 2.47 are met. In other words, one must obtain
an accurate estimate of P̄ab before deciding between a more conservative method (e.g.
CI) or ignoring the cross-correlation terms altogether. Without a technique to accurately
estimate cross-correlation, this is not particularly useful.
2.5.3

Game-Theoretic Filter (GTF).

Motivated by fusion accuracy improvement over the CI method, the Game-Theoretic
Filter (GTF) [49] provides a novel method to select the weight parameter w from (2.42). In
addition to minimizing the tr(Pcc ) the GTF simultaneously guesses the smallest sufficient
value of Pab in a “convex-concave” game [49]. To perform a measurement update, the GTF
simultaneously iterates on estimates for Pab and w to minimize the tr(Pcc ) while meeting
the following linear matrix inequality constraint:
minimize w supPab tr(Pcc )


 P

P
ab 
 aa

subject to 
≥0
 P T P 
ab

bb

The GTF is designed to select a less conservative estimate of Pab than the CI method.
The GTF seems particularly suited to fusing measurements which contain only a partial
state estimate update. However, the GTF may tend to overestimate available information.
2.5.4

Interleaved Update (IU) Algorithm.

The IU algorithm [7] provides a multi-filter approach to the inconsistency problem.
This algorithm retains consistency by maintaining separable state estimates xi and
covariance estimates Pi for collaborative offboard measurements.

For example, the

covariance matrices associated with vehicles i, j are assembled in a block diagonal matrix
Pi,j (t) as shown in (2.48).

 P (t)
0
 i
Pi,j (t) = 
 0
Pj (t)
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(2.48)

The timestamp of the most recent measurement update from each vehicle is
maintained in a Ti matrix where each row q represents a filter and each column i represents
an offboard vehicle number. Row 1 in Ti corresponds to the set of states which has never
been updated by an offboard range measurement. All filters are always updated by onboard
measurements.
For example, when vehicle 1 first receives an offboard range measurement from nearby
vehicle 2 at time t, the current state estimate x1 and covariance P1 are copied to form a
new set x2 and P2 which are updated by the range measurement from vehicle 2. These
parameters are separated into a new filter which is propagated and updated separately from
x1 and P1 . A T1 (t) matrix onboard vehicle 1 is instantiated. Within T1 (t), row (filter)
2, column (vehicle) 2 is updated with a timestamp for the offboard measurement update
from vehicle 2. Equation (2.49) shows how row 1 is updated by vehicle 1’s onboard
measurements, so (row 1, column 2) of T1 (t) remains 0.


t 0


T1 (t) = 
.
t t 

(2.49)

At the next time step, no offboard measurements from vehicle 2 are received. As
expected, the entry at row (filter) 2, column (vehicle) 2 remains t.

Since onboard

measurements are received at t + 1, the entries in column (vehicle) 1 are updated. Since
filter 1 is only updated by vehicle 1, the entry at row (filter) 1, column (vehicle) 2 is always
0. In this case, (2.50) shows the updated Ti (t + 1) matrix is of the form


t + 1 0


T1 (t + 1) = 
.
t + 1 t 

(2.50)

The T1 (t) matrix propagated in (2.49) and (2.50) keeps track of which vehicles have
been used to update which filter as well as the age of the last updates.
Each time a collaborative measurement is broadcast from vehicle i to another vehicle,
it contains current copies of xi , Pi , and Ti . With these parameters, the receiving vehicle
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j always has access to a state estimate and covariance which have only been updated by
sensors on the transmitting vehicle i. This uncorrelated information can be used by vehicle
j without inconsistency.
A vehicle i receives a broadcast from vehicle j containing information xj , Pj , and Tj
to update filter q onboard vehicle i. If information from vehicles other than j is present, the
optimal combination of filter information is selected for fusion by examining the trace of
the fused covariance estimate Pqi . The combination of filter information that results in the


argmin tr(Pqi ) is used to update filter q onboard vehicle i. The IU algorithm requires each
vehicle to maintain 2n simultaneous Kalman filters. The author speculated that 30 unique
vehicle IDs are attainable with this framework [7].
2.5.5

Collaborative Localization Simulation.

We examine three collaborative localization approaches in a simple 2-D scenario with
multiple vehicles operating in a distributed wireless sensor network. This simulation was
based on an cooperative 4-vehicle scenario [49]. Only one vehicle is equipped with an
absolute positioning source (GPS) and all vehicles are equipped with ranging sensors.
The sampling rate of every vehicle in the network is fixed at 1 Hz with synchronized
measurement updates. The network is monitored by a single centralized Kalman Filter
(KF) which can observe all sensor measurements. The GTF, CI, and NF methods operate
in a decentralized wireless sensor network with each vehicle operating independently and
locally without knowledge of the entire network. Vehicle 1 receives a GPS update on every
sample and vehicles 2-4 rely on collaborative localization. All vehicles are able to share
their positions over a distributed network and can obtain noise-corrupted ranging to each
other. The vehicles are initialized with random Gaussian 2-D velocity with a mean of
0.1 meters per second and maximum velocity of 0.5 meters per second. The vehicles are
constrained to a 50 m2 area. If the vehicles contact the boundary, the velocity component
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in the direction of the boundary is inverted so the vehicle “ricochets” to stay within the
constrained area.
The range measurements are corrupted by zero-mean independent bivariate Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) from other nearby nodes in 2-D space. In the example,
nearby nodes have unique positions separated by true distance Dn and each range
observation Rn is corrupted by zero-mean AWGN with magnitude σcoop . Ranging error
Vn is known and clock synchronization is assumed.
Rn = Dn + Vn , where Vn ,→ N(µ, S)
¯
 


0
σ2
0 
 
 coop
2
µ =   , and S = σcoop I = 
 meters
 0
2
¯ 0
σ 

(2.51)

coop

with n = {1, 2, .., N} observations from nearby nodes
and σ2coop = 0.1 m2 .
At each sample, a node receives a range measurement Rn from each nearby node.
     
 x   x   x 
 1  2  n
with nearby nodes positioned at   ,   , ...   .
y  y  y 
1

2

n

At each sample, vehicle 1 receives an GPS measurement update with


σ2

0
 GPS

 meters
2
RGPS = σGPS I = 

 0
σ2 

(2.52)

GPS

2
and σGPS
= 1 m2 .

Vehicles 2-4 self-localize by combining shared position estimates from nearby
vehicles with ranging measurements RN . These measurements are updated using three
distributed estimators (GTF, CI, and NF) and one centralized estimator (KF) for a duration
of 200 samples.
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2.5.6

Estimator Credibility Analysis.

Estimator performance is always dependent on available measurements. Accordingly,
estimators should be compared using the same data set which is sufficiently large to provide
statistically significant results. At first glance, position mean-squared error (MSE) appears
to be a simple, practical performance metric to compare different estimators. For n total
measurements, the bias e
x of state estimate b
x at time i is shown by (2.53). The MSE of e
x is
shown by 2.54.

e
xi = xi − b
xi

(2.53)

1 T
xi
x e
MS E = e
n i

(2.54)

Although easily understandable, this definition of MSE only provides information
about the first moment of estimation error. Estimators also maintain a self-assessment of
the second moment of estimation error, known as the error covariance P. The self-assessed
bias and covariance of the state estimate can be used to assess the credibility of an estimator.
Li defines estimator credibility as
“the difference between [an estimator’s] actual bias and MSE matrix and
its self-assessment (i.e. calculated bias and error covariance) at statistical
confidence level α in the sense that the two sets of quantities involved can
be treated as equal statistically” [52].
The Normalized Estimation Error Squared (NEES) metric, γi , is chi-square distributed,
assumes Gaussian errors, and provides a quantitative assessment of the estimator’s credibility from pessimistic to optimistic. NEES is calculated according to Eq. 2.55.

γi = (xi − b
xi )T Pi−1 (xi − b
xi )
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(2.55)

For an m-dimensional state estimate with n total measurements, the Average NEES is
shown by Eq. 2.56.
n

γ=

1 X
γi
nm i=1

(2.56)

NEES represents the square of the distance between the state estimate b
x and the
truth x, normalized by the error covariance P. Average NEES can be interpreted as a
uni-dimensional average of this squared distance. Average NEES quantifies estimator
credibility by assessing the accuracy of employed assumptions. If the Average NEES is
near 1, then the estimator is likely credible. If the Average NEES is much less (greater)
than 1, it is pessimistic (optimistic).
2.5.7

Numerical Results.

Figures 2.8-2.9 show position errors for the Game-Theoretic Filter (GTF), Covariance
Intersection (CI) method, Naive Filter (NF), and centralized Kalman Filter (KF) over the
200-sample simulation. The centralized KF optimally combines all available information
and is only shown to indicate maximum possible performance. The NF ignores crosscorrelation terms and is only shown as a minimum performance threshold.

This is

expected because ignoring cross-correlation terms causes the filter to overestimate available
information which results an overconfident state estimate. The CI and GTF methods
generate well-behaved errors. Table 2.1 shows a summary of Position MSE for each
method. Analysis indicates the GTF method is able to produce a significant (45%)
reduction in Position MSE over the CI method for the collaborative vehicles.
Further analysis of the second moment (covariance) of the state estimate is required
to draw further conclusions. Figures 2.10-2.11 show NEES for the 200-sample simulation.
The propagated state estimate contains 4 states (x, y position and x, y velocity). For this
scenario, (2.55) dictates that a ‘perfectly’ credible estimator should produce NEES value
of 4, equal to the dimensionality of the state estimate.
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Both the CI and GTF methods generate nearly identical NEES values for the GPSequipped vehicle 1. This is expected because the measurement covariance associated with
a GPS update is very small compared to a collaborative localization measurement update.
Vehicles 2-4 rely on collaborative localization updates and amplify the differences between
cross-correlation estimates between the CI and GTF methods. The CI method NEES values
never exceed 4. This indicates that the CI method is always pessimistic. In contrast, the
GTF makes temporal excursions into optimistic territory as evidenced by values exceeding
4 during the simulation.
Table 2.2 shows a summary of Average NEES for the GTF and CI methods. The
optimal value for Average NEES is 1 based on the n term in the denominator of (2.56).
Based on the mean distance from 1 for each collaborative vehicle, the GTF method is more
credible than the CI method. It is important to note that the GTF method provides an
average optimistic assessment for vehicle 2 with an Average NEES value of 1.08. Overly
optimistic estimators can be susceptible to divergence. Depending on the application,
it may be desired to implement a consistently pessimistic estimator rather than a more
credible estimator that is occasionally optimistic.

Table 2.1: Position MSE for Distributed Localization Scenario [m]

Vehicle (Localization Source)

GTF

CI

NF

KF

1 (GPS + Collaborative)

0.1062

0.1100

9.6567

0.0652

2 (Collaborative)

0.6490

1.1681

10.0114

0.0733

3 (Collaborative)

0.6599

1.1630

9.8668

0.0761

4 (Collaborative)

0.4620

0.7779

9.7423

0.0666
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Table 2.2: Average NEES for Distributed Localization Scenario

Vehicle (Localization Source)

2.5.8

GTF

CI

1 (GPS + Collaborative)

0.3386

0.3472

2 (Collaborative)

1.0775

0.1848

3 (Collaborative)

0.8306

0.1703

4 (Collaborative)

0.3745

0.1784

Collaborative Resiliency Against Simultaneous Sensor Failures.

The ARMAS framework provides all-source navigation for a single vehicle with
seamless transitions between a main EKF and J EKF subfilters corresponding to I allsource sensors. This research intends to modify the ARMAS framework to provide
navigation resiliency against simultaneous sensor failures via collaboration. Each tier 1
subfilter is uncorrupted by measurements from one of the all-source sensors. The main filter
fuses all available sensor measurements and is primarily used for user output. Assuming
I total all source sensors (including offboard sources), ARMAS will maintain a main filter
(for user output) and I tier 1 subfilters. To preserve estimator consistency in the event
 
of S simultaneous sensor failures, ARMAS must maintain at least SI filters. Assuming

I = 7 sensors, ARMAS must maintain at least 72 = 21 tier 2 subfilters to be guaranteed a
consistent estimator uncorrupted by measurements from any 2 simultaneous sensor failures.
We have established that the tier S subfilters are each uncorrupted by S sensors. To
detect if overlapping obervability is threatened, a stochastic observability test can indicate
whether S simultaneous sensor failures would lead to loss of overlapping observability.
For example, suppose there are I = 7 all-source sensors, 3 of which are off-board
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Figure 2.8: Position Error for Collaborative Vehicles 1, 2
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Figure 2.9: Position Error for Collaborative Vehicles 3, 4
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Figure 2.10: Normalized Estimation Error Squared for Collaborative Vehicles 1, 2
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Figure 2.11: Normalized Estimation Error Squared for Collaborative Vehicles 3, 4
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contributors. In this case, ARMAS should maintain at least

I
C

=

7
3

= 35 subfilters to

ensure a proprioceptive filter is maintained. To mitigate the risk of losing overlapping state
observability and double-counting, ARMAS should maintain at least F subfilters defined
by (2.57).

Fmin

!
I
=
max[S , C]

(2.57)

where I is the total number of sensors (onboard + offboard), S is the number of
subfilters required to maintain overlapping observability, and C is the number of offboard
measurements. Note the factorial growth of the required subfilters.
2.5.9

Chapter Summary.

This chapter summarized relevant methods required to tackle the collaborative allsource navigation problem.

The chapter began by establishing notation conventions

and reference frames used throughout this dissertation. Next, summaries of recursive
Bayesian estimation, residual monitoring, inertial navigation, and all-source navigation
were provided. Next, the resilient all-source ARMAS navigation framework and SAARM
algorithms were discussed. An overview of stochastic observability methods was discussed
in the context of navigation state analysis. We analyzed several current cross-correlation
management techniques which can be used to support fusion of off-board collaborative
sensor information. Lastly, we described NEES and its application for assessment of
estimator credibility.
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III.

Real-time Trajectory Optimization for Collaborative Self-Localization in
Random Aircraft Formations

3.1

Introduction
Persistent self-localization requires a resilient navigation solution, so it is critically

important that we understand how to take advantage of performance benefits associated
with collaborative localization and navigation [78]. Self-localization is the ability to
accurately determine one’s position accurately which is dependent on minimizing absolute
and relative positioning errors. Early localization trajectory optimization methods were
limited to offline estimation for a known reference trajectory [15], [32].

In [32],

Helferty employed minimization of the tr(CRLBθ̂ ) for trajectory optimization for offboard
localization of a single target. Several recent techniques have been presented to optimize
self-localization with a static network topology [3, 5, 39, 51, 55]. The relevance of
localization optimization is underscored by recent developments in practical methods for
maximizing localization performance under network communication resource constraints
[57]. This chapter contributes a real-time heuristic method of trajectory generation for a
single aircraft (referred to as the optimized node) to minimize relative positioning error in
a wireless sensor network composed of a simulated formation of maneuvering aircraft.
With the proliferation of wireless sensor networks, there is an opportunity to
collaboratively augment other aircraft in a degraded navigation environment. An anchor
node can be defined as any node whose absolute location can be estimated accurately
(e.g. GPS, highly reliable alternative navigation, etc.). In this scenario, simulated aircraft
(anchor nodes) flying in a random dynamic formation are able to share their true position
with nearby nodes over a wireless network. A single aircraft (optimized node) obtains noisy
range measurements to each formation aircraft and combines this information with aircraft
positions reported over a distributed wireless sensor network. Real-time trajectory guidance
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is generated for the optimized node based on real-time minimization of relative positioning
error. Since relative position error is based on the geometry between the optimized node
and nearby formation nodes, this chapter introduces Self-Aligning Swarm (SAS), a realtime trajectory generation algorithm for self-localization.
In the following section, we review relevant background material which examines
trade-offs associated with local and global cost minimization. We discuss the importance
of algorithm scalability and conservation of resources given diminishing returns associated
with capturing a global minimum which ultimately drove SAS towards local minimization.
Next, we provide a derivation of the 2-D Cramér-Rao Lower Bound for a known variance
which clarifies the importance of diverse angular coverage for reduction in relative
positioning error. An introduction to the pseudolite cofactor matrix and comparison of
SAS cost functions is performed and an anti-collision parameter is introduced. Next,
we introduce the kinematics model for the simulated formation nodes and walk through
an example of trajectory generation for a SAS-optimized node. Once the details of
the simulation are explained, we provide the numerical results for a 10K trial Monte
Carlo simulation. The results show the benefits of SAS optimization over a baseline
formation trajectory. The chapter concludes with our overall assessment of SAS, potential
applications for the algorithm, and recommendations for future work.
3.2

Self-Aligning Swarm (SAS) Algorithm for Self-localization
3.2.1

Background.

SAS was originally conceived as a distributed heuristic global optimization algorithm
for self-localization. The initial goal was to optimize the real-time trajectory for single
node self-localization across a complex, dynamic cost surface. At each time step, a
CPU-intensive global search of the cost surface was performed.

The complexity of

this computation has motivated previous approximation methods such as the alpha shape
for efficient estimation of localization performance [55]. A vector from the optimized
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node’s current position to the particle exhibiting the lowest cost was used to generate
a guidance vector. This method required knowledge of the entire cost surface (which
is likely unavailable) to guarantee a global minimum.

The computation required to

perform this search grows exponentially with search area. In a dynamically maneuvering
formation of anchor nodes, the location of the global cost minimum can vary significantly,
especially in the case of multiple competing minima. For example, there could be two or
more minima fluctuating with approximately the same cost value in opposite directions
from the optimized node. It would be counterproductive for a physical aircraft with
momentum to expend resources to abruptly change direction to chase an ephemeral global
minimum. There are diminishing returns associated with chasing a global minimum for
self-localization.
For these reasons, a distributed heuristic local minimization algorithm was conceived
with a small search area centered around the optimized node. To improve particle swarm
efficiency, the size of the search area is no larger than the velocity and/or maneuvering
capabilities of the optimized node. This means the search is constrained to positions
the optimized node can actually achieve. This permits the designer to spawn a small,
fixed number of particles for each heuristic search. By constraining the search area to
the capabilities of the optimized platform, the local method does not guarantee a global
minimum, nor does it guarantee the most direct trajectory to the minimum. However, the
local method has a small, scalable computing burden and provides a stable, predictable
trajectory to a dynamic self-localization optimum for reduction in relative position error
and does not waste resources attempting to locate an unachievable solution.
3.2.2

2-D CRLB for Range Measurements in AWGN .

A node of interest receives range measurements corrupted with zero-mean independent
bivariate Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) from other nearby nodes in 2-D space.
In the example, nearby nodes have unique positions separated by true distance Dn and each
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range observation rn is corrupted by zero-mean AWGN with magnitude σ. Ranging error
vn is known and clock synchronization is assumed.

r = d + v, where v ,→ N(µ, S)

(3.1)

where r, d, and v are vectors of dimension N × 1 with n = {1, 2, ..., N} nearby nodes.
S = σ2 I2×2 with σ = 5m with µ = 0. At each time step, i, the optimized node receives a
range measurement Rn from each nearby node
   
 
 x   x 
 x 
 1   2 
 n
with nodes positioned at   ,   , ...   .
y  y 
y 
1

2

n

Next we derive the Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) for the self-localization position
estimate Θ̂, where Θ̂i = x̂0 and Θ̂ j = ŷ0 using range measurements corrupted by zeromean independent AWGN. The Fisher Information Matrix (FIM), I(Θ), describes the
observable information from the range measurements. The inverse of the FIM is the CRLB
which provides a best-case estimate of the lower bound of the variance of the observable
information (3.2).

I(Θ̂)−1 = CRLBΘ̂ .

(3.2)

To obtain the FIM, we examine the expected value of the derivative of the Probability
Density Function (PDF) for each range measurement rn with respect to our self-localization
position estimate Θ̂ to understand how much information is available (3.3).
2
 d
p(r|Θ̂) } =
I(Θ̂) = E{
dΘ̂

Z

∞

−∞

!
d 
p(r|Θ̂) 2
dΘ̂
p(R|Θ̂)

p(r|Θ̂)dr.

(3.3)

The pdf is
−(r−Θ̂)2
1
p(r|Θ̂) = √
e 2σ2 .
2πσ
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(3.4)

The partial derivative of (3.4) with respect to Θ̂ divided by the pdf from (3.4) is
d
p(r|Θ̂)
dΘ̂

p(r|Θ̂)

=

d √1
e
dΘ̂ 2πσ
√1 e
2πσ

−(rn −Θ̂)2
2σ2

−(r−Θ̂)2
2σ2

=

r − Θ̂
.
σ2

When combined with (3.3) results in Fisher information shown in (3.5).
Z

∞

 r − Θ̂ 2

−(r−Θ̂)2
1
2σ2 dr
e
√
σ2
−∞
2πσ
Z ∞
1
1
−r2
=−√
r2 e 2 dr = 2 .
σ
2πσ −∞

I(Θ̂) = −

(3.5)

To obtain the Fisher Information matrix, we begin by taking the partial derivatives of each
distance, Dn with respect to the node’s location, x0 and y0 .

Ii j =

N
1 X dDn dDn
where Θ̂i = x0 , Θ̂ j = y0 ,
σ2 n=0 dΘ̂i dΘ̂ j

and where Dn =

p
(x0 − xn )2 + (y0 − yn )2 ).

dDn
d
=
dx0
dΘ̂i
=

q

(x0 − xn )2 + (y0 − y2n )

(− 1 )
1
(x0 − xn )2 + (y0 − y2n ) 2 [2(x0 − xn )]
2
=
d
dDn
=
dy0
dΘ̂ j

=

(3.6)

x0 − xn
Dn
q

(3.7)

(x0 − xn )2 + (y0 − y2n )

(− 1 )
1
(x0 − xn )2 + (y0 − y2n ) 2 [2(y0 − yn )]
2
=

y0 − yn
Dn
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(3.8)

We can avoid taking the log-likelihood by making use of basic trigonometry. Figure
3.1 shows that the partial derivatives of the distance between nodes are equivalent to the
following trigonometric identities:

cos(φn ) =

x0 − xn
Dn

sin(φn ) =

y0 − yn
Dn

Figure 3.1: Visualization of Partial Derivatives of Dn

If we manipulate (3.6), we can show it is proportional to the expected value of the partial
derivatives of the distance measurements. The elements of the Fisher information matrix
(row i, column j) are
N

N 1 X dDn dDn
Ii j = 2
σ N n=0 dΘ̂i dΘ̂ j
"
#
N dDn dDn
= 2E
.
σ
dΘ̂i dΘ̂ j

(3.9)
(3.10)

The resulting Fisher Information matrix is


 E[cos2 (φ )]
E[cos(φn )sin(φn )]
n
N 

I = 2 

σ E[sin(φ )cos(φ )]
2
E[sin (φn )] 
n
n
55

(3.11)

accordingly, the Cramér-Rao Lower Bound is
−1


 E[cos2 (φ )]
E[cos(φ
)sin(φ
)]
n
n
n 
σ 

Cov(θ̂) ≥


N E[sin(φ )cos(φ )]

2
E[sin
(φ
)]
n
n
n
2

(3.12)

Figure 3.2: Optimal 2-D Self-Localization Geometry for N = 7 Anchor Nodes

The diagonal terms of the CRLBθ̂ matrix define the dimensions of a 2-D covariance
ellipse for relative positioning error. For example, minimum relative self-localization error
for N = 7 anchor nodes is achieved when anchor nodes are evenly spaced and centered on
the the self-localization node (See Figure 3.2). In this example, the diagonal terms of the
FIM are

E[cos2 (φn )] = E[sin2 (φn )] ≈ 0.5
and the off-diagonal terms are
E[cos(φn )sin(φn )] = E[sin(φn )cos(φn )] ≈ 0.
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The resulting CRLB is

−1
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2σ2
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.
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Assuming the anchor nodes remain static, the diagonal terms of the FIM will decrease
if the Self-Localization node moves from its current position. This results in a larger
value for the tr(CRLBθ̂ ). This forms the motivation for minimization of the tr(CRLBθ̂ )
for generating an optimized self-localization trajectory.
3.2.3

Pseudolite Cofactor Matrix and SAS Cost Function.

The definition of CRLBθ̂ in Eq. 3.12 elucidates the importance of diverse angular
coverage for reduction in relative positioning error variance. For a 2-D pseudolite-based
self-localization problem, the design matrix, P for N nodes (Eq. 3.13), can be expressed in
a similar manner as (3.7) and (3.8).


 x1 −x0 y1 −y0 
r1 

 r1
 x −x y −y 
 2 0 2 0 
r
r2 
 where r is defined by Eq. 3.1.
P =  2

 ...
... 



 xN −x0 yN −y0 
rN

(3.13)

rN

The pseudolite cofactor matrix Σ c for this example can be computed using a least squares
method shown in (3.14)

Σ c = (PT P)−1


 2
σ  σ x
=

N σ
2

yx


σ xy 
 .
2
σy 

(3.14)

Minimization of the tr(Σ c ) (Eq. 3.15) is equivalent to minimizing the tr(CRLBθ̂ ).
σ2 2
tr(Σ c ) =
(σ x + σ2y ).
N

(3.15)

It is assumed that the initial starting position [x0 , y0 ]T of the optimized node is known
and is used to initialize an iterative nonlinear self-localization position estimator which
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relies on MATLAB’s f itlnm nonlinear model fit function to perform a self-localization
estimate. For all i > 1, the ti−1 position estimate is used to initialize the self-localization
estimator. The cost function employed in the SAS algorithm is composed of trajectory
optimization with an anti-collision function (3.16).

S AS Cost = tr(Σ c ) + A

PN
1

r−1
n

.

(3.16)

where A is a desired anti-collision avoidance factor, N is the total number of nearby
formation nodes, and rn is a noisy range measurement from node n.
The avoidance term in the cost function is approximately 1 until the optimized node is
in proximity of a formation node. A determines the gradient of this anti-collision function.
In this simulation, A was chosen to mitigate incursions inside 100 meters of other nodes.
SAS minimizes Eq. 3.16 at each time step to determine an optimal trajectory for the
optimized node.
3.2.4

Simulation.

The general shape of a surface defined by the tr(CRLBθ̂ ) for a formation of networked
nodes is convex, with the global minimum typically existing somewhere near the center of
the formation network. Since self-localization performance is based primarily on angular
coverage from anchor nodes, there can be significant benefits to trajectory optimization
with suboptimal formation topology.
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 3.3, there is a single optimized node and N = 7
anchor nodes in a random, dynamic formation. Figure 3.3 shows the results of this
initialization with a single optimized node and N formation nodes visible on a 2-D plane
at t0 = 0.0 sec. N nodes provide their absolute positions to a optimized node over a
simulated digital wireless network. The single optimized node is able to collect noisy range
measurements to each formation node with σrange = 5 m (detailed explanation presented in
Section 3.2.3). 10, 000 Monte Carlo trials were performed lasting a duration of T trial = 150
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sec each. At the beginning of each run, all of the nodes are initialized at random, normallydistributed 2-D locations on a square 400 km2 grid.
To simulate a randomly maneuvering formation of fixed-wing aircraft travelling in the
same direction, the formation nodes are initialized with a stable 2-D velocity V0 = 100 m/s
initially in the +X direction with a Gaussian random angular perturbation defined by Eq.
3.17.

Θi = 0.8Θi−1 + 0.2φ.

(3.17)

where time step size ti is 1 second, Θ is the current 2-D velocity angle and φ is a
normally distributed random angle between [0, 2π] radians generated for each formation
node every time step ti . The effect of Eq. 3.17 is visible in Figure 3.4.
In the same manner as the formation nodes, the optimized node is initialized at a
random 2-D location on the 400 km2 grid. Noisy range measurements are performed
between the optimized node and each formation node at each time step. MATLAB’s
‘fit nonlinear model’ function f itnlm is used to obtain an iterative least-squares position
estimate for the optimized node’s absolute 2-D position using the noise-corrupted range
measurements and true absolute positions of the nearby nodes. Detailed explanations of
the range measurements and absolute position estimate methods are presented in Section
3.2.3.
The optimized node is infinitely maneuverable with a maximum velocity of 250 m/s.
The trajectory of the optimized node is based on a particle swarm search of size 10 particles
inside a local circular area of radius 250 m centered on the location of the optimized node.
The optimized node trajectory is established by following the local gradient of the cost
function at each time step. Once a local minimum is captured inside the search area, the
optimized node follows the surface gradient to the minimum and maneuvers as necessary
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Figure 3.3: SAS Initialization with Random Node Locations and Initial Trajectory, t0 = 0.0
sec
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Figure 3.4: SAS Formation Node Trajectories with Angular Perturbations, t = 1.0 sec
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to maintain the local minimum. The optimized node will continue to follow the surface
gradient towards a local minimum, resulting in a real-time optimized self-localization
trajectory.
Figure 3.5 shows the contour of the particle swarm cost function given by Eq. 3.16
for the configuration shown in Figure 3.3 from the perspective of the optimized node.
The peaks resulting from the anti-collision term visible in Figure 3.5 indicate where the
formation nodes are located. These are the same nodes visible in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.6
shows the contour surface of tr(CRLBθ̂ ) without the anti-collision term. It is apparent that
the locations of the minima of the tr(CRLBθ̂ ) are unaffected by the anti-collision term which
ensures that minimization of the cost function is equivalent to minimization of the tr(Σc )
and tr(CRLBθ̂ ), from Equations 3.12 and 3.14.
The optimized node’s current trajectory follows the gradient of the cost surface in
Figure 3.5 towards the minimum value of the surface and is identified by a vector arrow.
Section 3.2.2 presents a derivation for the lower bound of the 2-D error variance. A proof
for the convergence of the bounds of total relative localization error to the minimization of
the tr(CRLB) is presented in [6].

As the simulation progresses, the heuristic search is repeated at each time step to
establish a new local minimum for self-localization trajectory optimization. Once the
optimized node arrives at the local minimum, its velocity will stabilize with the surrounding
formation and the optimized node will maneuver to maintain optimal self-localization
geometry within the local search area. At each time step, position residuals are recorded for
the optimized node and position MSE is recorded for the duration of the run. The results
for a 10K-trial Monte Carlo simulation are discussed in Section 3.3.
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Figure 3.5: Initial Node Trajectory Towards Local Minimum of Cost Function, t0 = 0.0 sec
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Figure 3.6: Contour of tr(CRLBθ̂ ) for Formation Node Network, t0 = 0.0 sec
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3.3

Numerical Results
The estimated mean position MSE for the SAS-optimized node and each of the 7 non-

optimized formation nodes are shown for 10K trials in Table 3.1. To develop a baseline
for comparison, localization estimates for the formation nodes were performed using the
same noisy ranging technique described in Section 3.2.3. The formation nodes perform
a ’default’ behavior by generally maintaining the same relative formation position for
the duration of the simulation. This comparison quantifies the difference between mean
position MSE observed from maintaining formation and from following the SAS-optimized
trajectory. Figure 3.8 shows the mean position MSE distributions for each of the 7 nonSAS formation nodes have nearly the same distribution for 10,000 trials. A t-test for
significant differences in mean variances indicates the variance of position MSE for the
SAS-optimized node is smaller than that of formation nodes with a p-value < 0.0001.
The reduction in variance is shown by a violin-plot comparison of the position MSE
distributions for 10K Monte Carlo trials shown in Figure 3.7.

Table 3.1: Mean Position MSE for 10K Trials, T trial = 150 sec, σrange = 5 m
Type/Behavior

µ̂ MS E

σ̂ MS E

Formation Nodes

4.06 m

0.981 m

SAS-Optimized Node

3.41 m

0.184 m

The overall reduction in mean position MSE and variance can be explained with an
example. If a node is randomly spawned at an unfavorable formation position, it is expected
to have a large CRLB (and position MSE) compared to a node spawned in a more favorable
position within the formation. In both situations, a SAS-optimized node will follow a
trajectory to minimize the tr(CRLBθ̂ ) which results in lower position MSE. In contrast, a
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formation node simply flies along with the formation with kinematics governed by Eq. 3.17
and does not optimize its position MSE. This difference in behavior results in the reduced
mean and variance for the SAS-optimized mean position MSE distribution.
A comparison of Normal-Gaussian distribution models fit to the SAS-optimized and
Formation Node 1 distributions is visible in Figure 3.9. The mean position MSE for the
SAS-optimized node approaches a Normal-Gaussian distribution which is a property not
shared by the formation trajectory nodes. Normally-distributed position error is desirable
for subsequent use with Bayesian estimators which often make this simplifying assumption
regardless of the actual error distribution.

3.4

Chapter Summary and Future Work
This chapter presents a novel real-time heuristic method of trajectory optimization

for a single SAS-optimized aircraft to minimize self-localization error in proximity to a
formation of randomly maneuvering aircraft. SAS is a compact, scalable heuristic method
to optimize collaborative self-localization performance for a single aircraft in a random
formation. SAS is shown to be a useful method for dynamic position error minimization.
A 10K-trial Monte Carlo simulation demonstrated SAS-optimized flight path trajectory
exhibits reduced mean position MSE and reduced variance for position MSE. The
simulation also shows the distribution of position MSE for the SAS-optimized aircraft
approaches normality whereas any other random formation aircraft exhibited a heavilyskewed error distribution. A potential practical application for SAS is implementation on
a potentially GPS-denied aircraft whose goal is to minimize Inertial Navigation System
drift in a collaborative network composed of all-source contributors.

Recommended

future work includes investigation of multiple cooperative anchor nodes for optimized
localization performance of off-board aircraft on a mission-dictated trajectory in a dynamic
environment.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of Mean Position MSE for 10K Trials, T trial = 150 sec, σrange = 5
m
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of Mean Position MSE Distributions for 10K Trials, T trial = 150
sec, σrange = 5 m
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of Normal-Gaussian Models Fit to SAS-Optimized and Formation
Node 1 Mean Position MSE Distributions for 10K trials, T trial = 150 sec, σrange = 5 m
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IV.

4.1

Swarm Control for Autonomous Navigation Support

Introduction
With modern computing resources, concurrent complex calculations can be performed

in real time and can be harnessed to optimize vehicle behavior for distributed tasks such as
swarm control. However, distributed algorithms must still employ a scalable topology to be
practically simulated and deployed. Scalability is particularly pertinent for large swarms.
This chapter focuses on Swarm Control for Autonomous Navigation Support (SCANS)
operating in a distributed simulation environment [27]. The application for SCANS is
real-time swarm-based navigation support in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
degraded and/or denied regions. In these areas, GNSS signals are either unavailable or
untrustworthy as a result of signal interference due to downlink jamming, spoofing, or
environmental features. Vehicles not equipped with all-source navigation sensors (e.g.
magnetic, visual, etc.) are subject to inertial integration drift in these types of environments.
Navigation support vehicles can be used to provide persistent autonomous multilateration
for nearby vehicles tasked with missions (Fig. 4.1). Given sensor payload, fuel and
cost constraints associated with small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), it is desirable
to federate costly all-source sensor payloads from mission payloads, especially if the
mission vehicles must be attritable. For example, an optically pumped magnetometer
costs approximately $20k [14]. The mission vehicles benefit from persistent surveillance
network multilateration support.
This chapter examines Swarm Control for Autonomous Navigation Support (SCANS)–
a distributed, importance-weighted swarm control scheme for autonomous navigation support. This chapter builds on previous work [26] and [27] by utilizing the SAS simulation
environment to provide a noise-corrupted network with realistic ranging and positioning
for navigation support vehicles. The primary goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the
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Figure 4.1: Importance-Weighted Navigation Support using Surveillance Network
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full selective, importance-weighted navigation support capabilities of SCANS within the
context of the SAS simulation environment. Four separate 10K Monte Carlo trials, encompassing over 1600 hours of simulated flight time, are performed for a 10-vehicle network
with mission vehicle weights varying from 0 to 100. We present results in terms of the 2-D
position RMSE for each mission vehicle. Monte Carlo trial results show optimized RMSE
for simultaneous multi-vehicle support. Mission vehicles with prominent importance (relative to the size of the swarm) achieve RMSE distributions that approach normality. This
chapter demonstrates results of large swarms (> 50 vehicles) with an overview of various
stable convergent SCANS vehicle formations.
In the following section, we examine previous work which resulted in the development
of SCANS. We examine the development of the SCANS algorithm based on distributed
greedy minimization and highlight key decisions made to enable scalable consensus-like
behavior. For context, we summarize the concept of magnetic anomaly field navigation
and recent real-world test results. During our analysis, we introduce the importance
weighting matrix which allows a distributed cooperative greedy algorithm to act in a nongreedy manner and optimize offboard vehicle navigation. Next, we introduce the mission
aircraft kinematics models and explain the quasi-cooperative control scheme for navigation
support aircraft. Once the details of the simulation are explained, we provide position
RMSE for supported mission vehicles in four separate 10K trial Monte Carlo simulations.
The weights assigned to each mission vehicle vary from 0 to 100. Our results show
that distributed greedy optimization results in weighted consensus-like optimization for
various subsets of mission vehicles. The chapter concludes with our overall assessment of
SCANS, potential applications for the algorithm in the realm of collaborative navigation,
and recommendations for future work.
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4.2

Related Work
4.2.1

Decentralized-Local vs. Centralized-Global Optimization.

Dynamic global optimization for a networked formation of anchor vehicles is quite
complex and has motivated simplifying approximation techniques like the alpha-shape
[55].

In the 1990s, any approach to trajectory optimization for relative localization

was limited to post-processed global algorithms [15, 32]. In [32], the author employed
minimization of the trace of the Cramér-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB), for iterative offline
trajectory optimization to localize a single moving target with a known trajectory. As
long as anchor locations can be estimated accurately, the minimization of the trace of the
CRLB is an effective technique [32] and forms the core optimization strategy of SCANS.
More recently, there have been several successful strategies presented to optimize selflocalization with static anchor locations [3, 5, 39]. All of these approaches relied on a
global optimization technique for localization with known static anchor locations.
Globally optimized trajectory control for single vehicle self-localization requires a
centralized architecture which is accompanied by increased communications overhead and
limited scalability [27, 71]. Coordinated dynamic multi-agent navigation support for noncooperative mission vehicles is even less tractable for global optimization. In a dynamically
maneuvering formation of anchor nodes, the location of the global cost minimum can
vary significantly, especially in the case of multiple competing minima. For example,
there could be two or more minima fluctuating with approximately the same cost value in
opposite directions from the optimized node. It would be counterproductive for a physical
aircraft with momentum to expend resources to abruptly change direction to chase an
ephemeral global minimum. There are diminishing returns associated with chasing a global
minimum for self-localization.
To guarantee a global minimum cost, the positions of all vehicles must be available
by a central agent and used to form an optimal set of multilateration position solutions
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for each mission vehicle in the surveillance network. Once the solutions are formed,
one could solve for a set of navigation support vehicle locations which would guarantee
a global optimum for multilateration accuracy at that instant. Once solved, control vectors
could be formed from each navigation support vehicle’s current location to the location
associated with a global minimum. The navigation support vehicles would each move
in the direction of this guidance solution. Since the mission aircraft trajectories are not
known a priori, this optimization is only valid for the current instant and would need to be
performed recursively. Centralized processing of all vehicle trajectories would be required
for deconfliction and is expected to require significant communications overhead.
For the aforementioned reasons, a distributed heuristic local minimization approach
was conceived with a small search area centered around the navigation support vehicle
[26]. A particle swarm was selected to sample a locally-constructed cost surface. The
heuristic computing burden is established by the size of the search area, which is no larger
than the velocity and/or maneuvering capabilities of the navigation support vehicle. This
means the search is constrained to positions the vehicle can actually reach in the next
time step [27]. This permits the particle swarm architect to generate a fixed number of
particles for each heuristic search which establishes a theoretical ceiling for the computing
burden. Most importantly, this computing burden scales linearly with the number of
agents. By constraining the search area to the vehicle’s capabilities, this local method does
not guarantee a global minimum, nor does it guarantee the most direct trajectory to the
minimum [27]. However, SAS has a small, scalable computing burden, provides a stable,
predictable trajectory to a dynamic optimum and does not waste resources attempting to
locate an unreachable trajectory.
4.2.2

Magnetic Navigation.

Magnetic navigation has been demonstrated as a persistent and accurate absolute
positioning source [12].

Unlike other feature-based techniques like vision-based
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navigation, variations in the Earth’s magnetic field are ubiquitous and can be continuously
sampled over the entire surface of the planet. For example, salient visual features are
probably sparse over large bodies of water or heavily forested regions. Star-trackers are
limited by background noise which is highly dependent on the diurnal cycle [53]. Since
magnetic measurements are based on the summation of all magnetic field components at
any given point, magnetic reference map detail is greatest near the Earth’s surface. Aircraft
are uniquely suited for magnetic anomaly navigation because they are able to sample large,
spatially diverse areas while maintaining relative proximity to the Earth’s surface [12].
Magnetic anomaly navigation can be performed passively and is resistant to interference
[14]. Once a reference map is created based on a magnetic survey, a magnetic anomaly map
can be constructed by a vehicle equipped with a sensitive magnetometer [34]. “A magnetic
anomaly map is the difference between the scalar magnetic field magnitude at any point in
space and the predicted magnetic field from a reference model” [14]. Typically, a particle
filter or similar non-Gaussian estimator is used for trajectory correlation and subsequent
localization. A flight test was performed in 2015 [14] over Louisa, VA using a single
aircraft equipped with an optically pumped magnetometer which achieved a horizontal
RMSE of 13.1 m under quiet atmospheric conditions. A horizontal RMSE of 15 m was
predicted under non-stable (stormy) atmospheric conditions. These results were used
to configure the absolute 2-D localization accuracy of the magnetic navigation support
vehicles simulated in the next section.
Terrestrial magnetic field anomaly navigation continues to show promise as means
of absolute positioning. For example, passively detected unique magnetic field anomalies
associated with known geographic locations or geomagnetic “signboards” were recently
studied as a means to validate GPS accuracy in the presence of suspected jamming or
spoofing [37]. In 2019, unique magnetic anomaly data were gathered by a vehicle equipped
with a magnetometer driving on public roads in a developed area near Eglin AFB, FL. The
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magnetometer was used to sample each of the four geographic magnetic field anomaly
locations and store the geomagnetic “signboard” signature data. Three days later, the same
configuration was used to measure magnetic field anomalies along a continuous driving
route and was able to positively correlate measurements with each correct landmark.
The authors reported strong Pearson’s correlation coefficients based on 95% confidence
intervals for correct localization for each signboard.
4.3

Swarm Control for Autonomous Navigation Support (SCANS) Algorithm for
Swarm Control
4.3.1

Introduction.

In a GNSS-denied environment, an autonomous swarm of magnetic navigation
support vehicles and a separate set of mission vehicles broadcast their positions over a
10-vehicle surveillance network. Autonomous trajectory control is performed for a set of
navigation support vehicles using the distributed SCANS algorithm to provide navigation
support of a set of mission vehicle(s). Operating on each navigation support vehicle,
SCANS uses a weighting matrix to proportionally distort the cost surface in favor of the
mission vehicle(s)’ localization by incentivizing navigation support vehicles to sacrifice
their own accuracy in favor of important offboard mission vehicle(s). This section describes
the position-based localization algorithm, the development of the cost function, and the
implementation of the SCANS simulation.
4.3.2

Localization Algorithm.

To localize, a mission vehicle performs 2-D range measurements corrupted with zeromean independent bivariate Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to navigation support
vehicles. Sensor positions are transformed into an East-North coordinate system with a
predefined origin. Nearby vehicles have unique positions separated by true distance Dn
and each range observation rn is corrupted by zero-mean AWGN with magnitude σ (4.1).
¯
Ranging error v is known and clock synchronization is assumed.
¯
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r = d + v, where v ,→ N(µ, S ).
¯ ¯ ¯
¯
¯ ¯¯

(4.1)

where r, D, and v are vectors of dimension N × 1 with n = {1, 2, ..., N} nearby vehicles.
¯ ¯
¯
2
S = σ I with σ = 5m and µ = 0. At each time step, i, a mission vehicle receives a range
¯ ¯¯
¯
¯¯
measurement rn from each nearby navigation support vehicle with positions reported as
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 x 
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  + w1 ,   + w2 , ...   + wN ,
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where wn ,→ N(µmag , Qn )
¯
¯¯
¯
for navigation support vehicles and
and wn ,→ N(µrelnav , Σc )
¯¯
¯
¯

(4.2)

(4.3)

for mission vehicles where each wn is a vector of dimension 2 × 1 for n = {1, 2, ..., N}.
¯
2
Qn = σmag I with σmag = 14.5 meters and µmag = 0. Σc is the cofactor matrix defined by
¯¯
¯ ¯¯
¯
¯
(4.10) and µrelnav = 0. At each time step, i, a noisy range measurement rn is performed
¯
¯
between a mission vehicle and each nearby navigation support vehicle.
It is assumed that the initial starting position [x0 , y0 ]T for each vehicle is known
and is used to initialize an iterative nonlinear self-localization position estimator which
relies on MATLAB’s f itnlm nonlinear model fit function to perform an instantaneous
“snapshot” self-localization estimate without Bayesian estimation. For all i > 1, the
previous ti−1 mission vehicle position estimate is used to initialize the current time step
ti self-localization estimator.
At each time step ti , 2-D position error is recorded for each mission vehicle in the
network. We use mission vehicle root-mean-square (RMS) position error as the primary
metric to assess algorithm performance. The results of four separate 10K Monte Carlo
trials are presented in the results section to demonstrate the weighted SCANS algorithm.
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4.3.3

Pluggable Cost Function.

The SCANS cost function is based on minimization of the trace of the Cramér-Rao Lower
Bound, tr(CRLB), for ranging with known noise in a pseudolite network. A more detailed
derivation for single vehicle localization is provided by [27]. The Fisher Information
Matrix (FIM) is defined as the inverse of the Cramér-Rao Lower bound (4.4) and indicates
how much information the noisy range measurements contain for localization.

I(Θ̂)−1 = CRLBΘ̂
¯¯

(4.4)

To derive the CRLB for a signal in AWGN, we examine the log-likelihood for each
observation, rn , with respect to the distance to each vehicle, n, dn (Θ), with dependency on
¯
relative geometry to understand how much information is available. A detailed derivation
using the log-likelihood function is presented in [26].

The resulting Fisher Information matrix is


 E[cos2 (φ )]
E[cos(φn )sin(φn )]
n
N 
 .
I=


¯¯ σ2 E[sin(φ )cos(φ )]
2
E[sin (φn )] 
n
n

(4.5)

Accordingly, the Cramér-Rao Lower Bound is

−1
 E[cos2 (φ )]

E[cos(φ
)sin(φ
)]
n
n
n 
σ 

Cov(θ̂) ≥

 .
N E[sin(φ )cos(φ )]

2
E[sin
(φ
)]
n
n
n
2

(4.6)

For a 2-D pseudolite-based self-localization problem, the design matrix, P for N
¯¯
vehicles can be expressed as (4.7)


 x1 −x0 y1 −y0 
 r1
r1 


 x2 −x0 y2 −y0 
 r
r2 
 where r is defined by (4.1).
(4.7)
P =  2

¯
¯¯  ...

... 

 xN −x0 yN −y0 
rN

rN
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A diagonal weighting matrix enables the designer to set individual importance values for
each vehicle in the swarm (4.8). The weighting matrix is designed to distort the cost surface
in favor of a particular set of vehicles.




w
0
0
 1



W =  0 . . . 0  for 1 to N vehicles


¯¯


0 0 wN 

(4.8)

For navigation support vehicles, a weight of 1 is assigned. Off-diagonal values are always
set to zero. A user configurable weight of zero or greater is assigned to each mission
vehicle. Values greater than 1 are used to distort the cost surface in favor of navigation
support for that vehicle. This is based on the idea that each member in the network
is “pulling on the same rope” and it is possible to optimize multilateration for a subset
of vehicles by disproportionately penalizing any movement which adversely affects an
important member with a large weight. For example, consider a 10-vehicle surveillance
network consisting of 3 mission vehicles {1, 2, 3} and 7 navigation support vehicles
{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. If the designer wishes to provide 0, 1, and 10-weighted autonomous
navigation support for mission vehicles {1, 2, 3}, respectively, (4.9) could be devised.
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The weighted pseudolite cofactor matrix Σc for this example can be computed using a least
¯¯
squares method shown in (4.10).

Σc = (PT W P)−1
¯¯ ¯¯ ¯¯
¯¯

(4.10)

The definition of Σc in (4.10) elucidates the importance of diverse angular coverage
¯¯
for reduction in relative positioning error variance. The shape of a cost surface defined by
the tr(Σc ) for a practical network of pseudolites (not all vehicles collocated) is convex.
¯¯
Therefore, minimization of (4.11) is expected to be stable for all practical pseudolite
networks. The cost function employed in the SCANS algorithm relies on minimization
of the cofactor matrix dimensions with an anti-collision function:

PN

S CANS Cost = tr(Σc ) + A
¯¯

1

rn−1

,

(4.11)

where A is a desired anti-collision avoidance factor, N is the total number of nearby
vehicles, and rn is a noisy range measurement from vehicle n.
The value of the avoidance term in the cost function is approximately 1 until a vehicle
travels near another vehicle. A determines the gradient of this anti-collision function. In
this simulation, A was set to mitigate incursions inside 100 meters. Avoidance parameter
tuning was accomplished iteratively via simulation. The SCANS algorithm is performed
recursively by each navigation support vehicle with using the same weighting matrix.
4.3.4

Simulation.

All vehicles are spawned with a random uniform position on a 2000 m2 2-D grid
(Fig. 4.2). The navigation support vehicles use noisy ranging described in the previous
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Figure 4.2: Snapshot for 10 Vehicle Network at ti = 1.0 sec, 3 Mission Vehicles with
weights of {0, 1, 10} and 7 Navigation Support Vehicles

Figure 4.3: Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface Snapshot for 10 Vehicle Network at ti
= 1.0 sec, 3 Mission Vehicles with weights of {0, 1, 10} and 7 Navigation Support Vehicles
from Perspective of Navigation Vehicle 1
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Figure 4.4: 3-D Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface Snapshot for 10 Vehicle Network
at ti = 1.0 sec, 3 Mission Vehicles with weights of {0, 1, 10} and 7 Navigation Support
Vehicles from Perspective of Navigation Vehicle 1
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Figure 4.5: Weighted Cost Surface for 10 Vehicle Network from Perspective of Navigation
Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 1 sec
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Figure 4.6: 3-D Weighted Cost Surface for 10 Vehicle Network from Perspective of
Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 1 sec

Figure 4.7: Snapshot for Stabilized 10 Vehicle Network at ti = 100 sec, 3 Mission Vehicles
and 7 Navigation Support Vehicles
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Figure 4.8: Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface for 10 Vehicle Network from
Perspective of Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 100 sec
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Figure 4.9: 3-D Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface for 10 Vehicle Network from
Perspective of Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 100 sec
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Figure 4.10: Weighted Cost Surface for 10 Vehicle Network from Perspective of Navigation
Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 100 sec
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section to simulate radio ranging to all vehicles in the surveillance network. Localization
estimation is performed instantaneously without recursive Bayesian estimation. At each
time step, ∆t = 1 sec, mission vehicles instantaneously localize via multilateration by
combining AWGN-corrupted navigation support vehicle positions (σmag = 14.5 m) over
the surveillance network (4.2) with AWGN-corrupted radio ranging (σrange = 5 m). Each
simulation runs for T = 150 seconds. Mission vehicle position residuals are recorded for
each time step and averaged over each run. The trajectories of the mission aircraft are
random and unknown.
The navigation support vehicles are infinitely maneuverable with a maximum velocity
of 25 m/s. The trajectory of each navigation vehicle is based on a particle swarm of size
10 inside a local circular area of radius 25 m centered on the location of the vehicle. Each
navigation support vehicle trajectory is established by following the local gradient of the
weighted cost function (4.11) at each time step. Once a local minimum is captured inside
the search area, the vehicle follows the surface gradient to the minimum and maneuvers as
necessary to maintain the local minimum. The vehicle will continue to follow the surface
gradient towards a local minimum, resulting in multilateration optimization.
To simulate a random formation, mission aircraft are initialized with a stable 2D velocity V0 = 10 m/s initially in the +X direction with a Gaussian random angular
perturbation defined by (4.12).

Θi = 0.8Θi−1 + 0.2φ,

(4.12)

where time step size is 1 second, Θ is the current 2-D velocity angle and φ is a Normally
distributed random angle between [0, 2π] radians generated for each mission vehicle every
time step ti .
For example, Fig. 4.2 shows the results of initializing a 10-vehicle network with 3
mission vehicles with various weights. The weighting matrix W is configured according
¯¯
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to (4.9). At t = 1 sec, the cost surface from the perspective of a random navigation
support vehicle indicates that specific vehicle control is in the [+x] direction (bottom-left
corner, Fig. 4.5). For the same instant, the tr(Σc ) surface from the perspective of the
¯¯
same navigation support vehicle is shown in Fig. 4.3. As expected, the random pseudolite
network results in a globally convex surface (Fig. 4.4). The SCANS cost surface retains
the globally convex shape which provides stable gradient-based cost minimization (Fig.
4.6). Note how mission vehicle 1 with w11 = 0 has no effect on the tr(Σc ) surface (Fig.
¯¯
4.3), but causes a disturbance in the SCANS cost surface (Fig. 4.5). This is expected
because mission vehicle 1 contributes to the avoidance parameter in the cost function. In
other words, guidance includes avoidance but no multilateration consideration for a mission
vehicle with a weight of 0.
The simulation is allowed to run for t = 100 sec until the autonomous swarm of 7 navigation vehicles has stabilized relative to the 3 mission vehicles (Fig. 4.7). The cost surface
defined by (4.11) is visible from the perspective of the same navigation support vehicle.
At t = 100 sec, the tr(Σc ) surface for the same navigation support vehicle is shown in Fig.
¯¯
4.10. With the exception of zero-weighted mission vehicle 1, the peaks resulting from the
anti-collision term visible in Fig. 4.10 coincide with the tr(Σc ) surface peaks in Fig. 4.8. As
¯¯
expected, the surface remains convex with a large optimized multilateration support region
nearly centered around the heavily weighted mission vehicle 3 with w33 = 10 (See Fig.
4.9). The SCANS cost surface retains the globally convex shape with a stable optimized
region resulting from distributed greedy minimization (See Fig. 4.11). Similarly, navigation support stabilized at t = 100 sec for mission vehicle 2 at an intermediate location
on the cost surface, corresponding to unity weighting. Lastly, mission vehicle 1 is given
no navigation support consideration and exists in a random non-optimal location (Fig. 4.7).
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The following pseudocode describes how SCANS is implemented on each navigation support vehicle.
SCANS for Weighted Distributed Navigation Support
Performed by each Autonomous Navigation Support Vehicle
1: Initialization Time t = 0 sec, Uniform Random Spawn All Vehicles across 2000m2

2-D grid
2: Initialize Particle Swarm

I 10 particles, kinematic search area, radius = 25m,

optimizedPosition = [xn (t), yn (t)]
3: Initialize Avoidance Parameter A
4: Initialize Design Matrix P

¯¯
5: Initialize Shared Weight Matrix W
¯¯
6: Initialize Convergence Threshold threshold = 0.01
7: while t < tmax do
8:

Input: Noise-Corrupted Vehicle Positions {x1 (t), y1 (t), ..., xN (t), yN (t)}

9:

Input: Noise-Corrupted Ranges {r1 (t), ...rN (t)}

10:
11:
12:

Populate Design Matrix P
¯¯
Construct Pseudolite Cofactor Matrix, Σc = (PT W P)−1 (4.10)
¯¯
¯¯ ¯¯ ¯¯
while ∆optPosition > threshold do

14:

Minimize SCANS Cost Function, S CANS Cost = tr(Σc ) + A
¯¯
end while

15:

t =t+1

16:

optimizedPosition = [xn (t), yn (t)]

17:

Output: optimizedPosition

13:

18: end while
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PN
1

rn−1

, (4.11)

4.4

Numerical Results
Four 10-vehicle surveillance network configurations (7-navigation support vehicles,

3 mission vehicles) were simulated with various mission vehicle importance weights to
assess the impacts on mission vehicle RMSE performance. The mean position error
for each vehicle over each run is recorded and used to produce a 10K trial 2D RMSE
distribution. In total, more than 1600 hours of flight time were simulated. In each set of 10K
trials, the 7 Navigation Support Vehicle RMSE distributions converged to the distribution
visible in Fig. 4.12. A grand mean RMSE was calculated for mission vehicle and is visible
in Table 1. Figs. 4.13-4.16 contain violin plot comparisons of the 2-D position RMSE
distributions for Monte Carlo Trials 1-4, respectively.

Based on simulation results, multilateration geometry drives the shape of the position
RMSE distribution. We expect a positive-shift in mean and less Gaussian behavior (i.e.
longer positive tails) as multilateration geometry to anchors worsens. The quality of
navigation support (i.e. multilateration geometry) is determined by the weight of the
mission vehicle relative to the total weight of the swarm. Trial 4 (Fig. 4.16) shows a
36% mean reduction in RMSE with a distribution that approaches Normality for SCANSweighted formation versus non-optimized mission vehicles in the formation. The nonoptimized vehicles exhibit highly positive-skewed error distributions which are suboptimal
for use in recursive estimators that make use of white Gaussian noise assumptions
regardless of the actual error distributions.

4.5

Large Swarm Behavior
Implementation of large SCANS-based swarm implementations are straightforward

due to the distributed, greedy architecture. In fact, any swarm size can be simulated with
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Figure 4.11: 3-D Weighted Cost Surface for 10 Vehicle Network from Perspective of
Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 100 sec

Figure 4.12: Example 2-D Position RMSE for Magnetic Navigation Support Vehicle 4,
Trial 3
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Figure 4.13: 2-D Position RMSE Mission Vehicle 2 vs Mission Vehicle 3, Monte Carlo
Trial 1
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Figure 4.14: 2-D Position RMSE Mission Vehicle 2 vs Mission Vehicle 3, Monte Carlo
Trial 2
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Figure 4.15: 2-D Position RMSE Mission Vehicle 2 vs Mission Vehicle 3, Monte Carlo
Trial 3
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Figure 4.16: 2-D Position RMSE Mission Vehicle 2 vs Mission Vehicle 3, Monte Carlo
Trial 4
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Mission Vehicle

Mission Vehicle 1

Mission Vehicle 2

Mission Vehicle 3

Weights,

µRMS E

µRMS E

µRMS E

W1 , W2 , W3

(median)

(median)

(median)

11.54 m

10.08 m

8.85 m

(10.59 m)

(9.42 m)

(8.84 m)

9.99 m

9.67 m

9.35 m

(9.43 m)

(9.64 m)

(9.34 m)

10.28 m

9.26 m

9.25 m

(9.49 m)

(9.23 m)

(9.22 m)

13.73 m

13.71 m

8.78 m

(12.61 m)

(12.56 m)

(8.78 m)

0, 1, 10

0, 10, 100

0, 10, 10

0, 0, 10

Table 4.1: Grand Mean (Median) 2-D Position RMSE for 10-Vehicle Network with Varying
Mission Vehicle Weights, (4) 10K Monte Carlo Trials

sufficient available processing cycles. It should be noted that the accuracy of multilateration
support increases with the size of the navigation support swarm. In other words, relative
navigation support vehicle geometry is less important as the size of the swarm increases as
a result of increased Fisher information available to each mission vehicle. In a 50-vehicle
simulation, initialized at t = 0 s, it is clear that the convex nature of the SCANS cost surface
is retained resulting in stable and convergent guidance for navigation support vehicles.
Fig. 4.17 shows the results of initializing a 50-vehicle network with 47 navigation support
vehicles and 3 mission vehicles with weights of 0, 5, and 50, respectively. Fig. 4.18 shows
the tr(Σc ) surface for the same network configuration. This surface is globally convex (Fig.
¯¯
4.19). Fig. 4.20 shows a contour plot of the SCANS cost surface. As expected, the cost
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surface retains the globally convex shape (Fig. 4.21) with local maxima resulting from the
avoidance parameter in (4.11).

Fig. 4.22 shows the results of a stabilized 50-vehicle network with 47 navigation
support vehicles and 3 mission vehicles with weights of 0, 5, and 50, respectively at ti = 250
sec. Fig. 4.23 shows the tr(Σc ) surface for the same network configuration. This surface
¯¯
shows a large optimized CRLB region containing both the weighted mission vehicles (Fig.
4.24). Fig. 4.25 shows the stabilized SCANS cost surface. As expected, the stabilized cost
surface remains convex overall with a stable, predictable swarm formation based on greedy
local cost minimization.

4.6

Chapter Summary and Future Work
This chapter presented a stable, distributed simulation environment with a pluggable

cost function and demonstrated its effectiveness for consensus-like multilateration optimization. As long as a globally convex cost surface can be generated, these simulation
techniques can be applied to solve very complex distributed mathematical problems in realtime. In this example, we have shown that this enables vehicles equipped with all-source
capability to provide localization improvement for other non-cooperative mission vehicles.
As the weight assigned to the mission vehicles is increased relative to the total weight of
the swarm, mission vehicle position RMSE is reduced and approaches a Normal-Gaussian
distribution. This effort provides real-time distributed vehicle control for consensus-like
offboard multilateration optimization in a simulated time-synchronized surveillance network. Future applications with this simulation technique include control schemes to optimize magnetic navigation accuracy using scalar map gradients.
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Figure 4.17: Snapshot for Initialized 50 Vehicle Network at ti = 1 sec, 3 Mission Vehicles
and 47 Navigation Support Vehicles
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Figure 4.18: Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from
Perspective of Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 1 sec
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Figure 4.19: Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from
Perspective of Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 1 sec
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Figure 4.20: Weighted Cost Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from Perspective of Navigation
Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 1 sec
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Figure 4.21: 3-D Weighted Cost Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from Perspective of
Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 1 sec

Figure 4.22: Snapshot for Stabilized 50 Vehicle Network at ti = 250 sec, 3 Mission Vehicles
and 47 Navigation Support Vehicles
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Figure 4.23: Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from
Perspective of Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 250 sec

Figure 4.24: 3-D Weighted Cofactor Matrix Trace Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from
Perspective of Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 250 sec
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Figure 4.25: Weighted Cost Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from Perspective of Navigation
Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 250 sec
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Figure 4.26: 3-D Weighted Cost Surface for 50 Vehicle Network from Perspective of
Navigation Support Vehicle 1 at ti = 250 sec
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V.

Stable Observability Monitoring

The Autonomous and Resilient Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS)
framework monitors residual-space test statistics across unique sensor-exclusion banks
of filters, (known as subfilters) to provide a resilient, fault-resistant all-source navigation
architecture with assurance. A critical assumption of this architecture, demonstrated in this
chapter, is fully overlapping state observability across all subfilters. All-source sensors,
particularly those that only provide partial state information (altimeters, TDoA, AOB, etc.)
do not intrinsically meet this requirement.
This chapter presents a novel method to monitor real-time overlapping position state
observability and introduces an “observability bank” within the ARMAS framework,
known as Stable Observability Monitoring (SOM). SOM uses real-time stability analysis
to provide an intrinsic awareness to ARMAS of the capabilities of the fault detection and
exclusion (FDE) functionality. We define the ability to maintain consistent all-source FDE
to recover failed sensors as navigation resilience. A resilient FDE capability then is one
that is “aware” of when it requires more sensor information to protect the consistency of
the FDE and integrity functions from corruption. SOM is the first demonstration of such a
system, for all-source sensors, that the authors are aware.
A multi-agent 3-D environment simulating both GNSS and position and velocity
alternative navigation sensors was created and individual GNSS pseudorange sensor
anomalies are utilized to demonstrate the capabilities of the novel algorithm. This chapter
demonstrates that SOM seamlessly integrates within the ARMAS framework, provides
timely prompts to augment with new sensor information from other agents, and indicates
when framework stability and preservation of all-source navigation integrity are achieved.
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5.1

Introduction
Introduced in 2018, ARMAS provided a generalized framework for real-time

management of heterogeneous, asynchronous all-source sensors [43]. This framework
was resilient to corruption from mismodeled, uncalibrated, and faulty sensors and was
accomplished by combining sensor validation, FDE, recalibration, and remodeling modes
in a single architecture.

Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring (SAARM)

was designed to provide all-source Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) and navigation
integrity functions within the ARMAS framework [44].

In this context, all-source

navigation resiliency is the ability to maintain consistent all-source FDE operations with
the ability to recover failed sensors. The pluggable Bayesian filters provided by the
SCORPION estimation architecture afforded needed flexibility to spawn, propagate, and
remove estimation filters on the fly [47]. SAARM required the designer to maintain a
set of unique navigation subfilters (each unique subfilter excludes measurements from a
different sensor) to maintain resilience to a single simultaneous sensor failure. A primary
assumption of the FDE and integrity functions was the ability to maintain overlapping
position state observability. This chapter presents a novel method to monitor real-time
overlapping position state observability and introduces an “observability bank” within the
ARMAS framework. These additions to ARMAS use real-time observability analysis at
the layer 2 subfilter level (each unique layer 2 subfilter excludes measurements from two
different sensors) to provide a timely indication to augment the framework with new sensor
data, thus protecting the consistency of the ARMAS FDE and integrity functions from
corruption.
5.2

Background
5.2.1

Autonomous Resilient Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS) .

The ARMAS framework was designed to gracefully recover from multiple types of
failure modes (bias, model mismatched, and/or sensor miscalibration) while attempting
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to maintain a consistent, uncorrupted navigation estimate. ARMAS employs a set of
SCORPION pluggable EKF estimators to address the following nonlinear navigation
problem:
ẋ(t) = f [x(t), α(t), u(t), t] + G(t)w(t)

(5.1)

where x is a N × 1 state vector of a vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude. The
measurement error states vector α is of dimension M × 1, u is the control input vector,
G is an (N + M) × Q linear operator, and w is a Q × 1 white noise process defined by a
Q × Q continuous process noise strength matrix, Q.
The state estimates are propagated through optimally combining the state process
model, sensor-specific calibration parameters, and measurement updates from j = 1...J
available all-source sensors. The measurement model for the jth sensor at time step k is
described by:


z[kj] = h[ j] x(t), α[ j] (t), u(t), t, p[ j] + v[kj] ,

(5.2)

where h[ j] is the nonlinear measurement function for the jth sensor, α[j] is an L × 1 subset
of α which contains additional error states needed to process sensor measurements, p[j] is a
P × 1 user-selectable model parameter vector for h[ j] , and vk is a Z × 1 discrete white noise
process with covariance defined by matrix R[j]
k .
The Z × 1 measurement residual for sensor j, r[j]
k is defined by


r[kj] = z[kj] − h[ j] x̂−k , α̂[kj]− , uk , tk , p̂[kj] ,

(5.3)

where x̂−k , α̂[kj]− , and p̂[kj] are estimated quantities. Assuming white Gaussian noise, the
measurement residual from (5.3) is expected to follow the distribution


r[kj] ,→ N 0N×1 , S[kj] ,
T

S[kj] = H[kj] P−k H[kj] + R[kj] ,

(5.4)
(5.5)
T

where P−k is the (N + M) × (N + M) state estimate covariance matrix at time tk and H[kj] is
the Z × (N + M) Jacobian of h[ j] .
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Sensors are initialized in one of two modes: trusted or untrusted. Untrusted sensors
are required to enter a sensor validation mode prior to being brought into monitoring mode
[42]. In validation mode, ARMAS employs a likelihood function to monitor the statistical
distribution of a user-defined monitoring period composed of recent Kalman pre-update
residuals. A Chi-square, χ∗ , test statistic is used to detect excursions outside a userdefined threshold across the sampling period. Sensors in validation mode are excluded from
impacting the main state estimates using a Schmidt partial update [9]. Trusted sensors are
directly brought online into monitoring mode. In monitoring mode, sensor measurements
are allowed to update the main state estimates. ARMAS employs the same pre-update
residual likelihood function used in the validation mode to monitor sensor performance. A
detailed explanation of monitoring mode, including FDE and integrity functions is given in
section 5.2.2.
Once a fault is detected, the sensor is no longer “trusted” and is quarantined from
affecting the core navigation state estimate, x̂[ j] . ARMAS attempts to reinitialize the sensor
via validation mode. If this fails, ARMAS attempts to repair and recover the faulty sensor
via two separate modes: sensor calibration and remodeling. In calibration mode, userselectable sensor parameters, p[ j] and/or α[ j] are estimated using residual monitoring from
trusted sensors that have observability of x. If there is a single calibration parameter,
ARMAS attempts to correct the calibration using residual monitoring and sends the sensor
back to validation mode. If linked extrinsic calibration parameters exist, (e.g. camera
lever arm and camera orientation within p[ j] or α[ j] ), these are estimated individually
and sequenced based on convergence of the state covariance matrix to maintain state
observability.
If the recalibrated sensor fails to pass sensor validation, the sensor enters remodeling
mode where ARMAS attempts to modify the measurement model, h[ j] , based on 1...S
user-defined measurement models. S concurrent filters are spawned (each with a unique
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measurement model), and an epoch of measurement residuals is gathered against the core
navigation estimate x. The ‘winning’ sensor measurement model is selected based on
which filter best matches the prescribed distribution (5.4) during the residual epoch. The
sensor then enters validation mode. If the remodeling mode does not result in a new model
selection, and Resilient Sensor Recovery (RSR) is activated, the sensor periodically reenters validation mode after a user-selectable time period in an attempt to overcome a
temporal anomaly [43]. Figure 5.1 is a state transition diagram depiction of these modes.
The result is a framework compatible with heterogeneous, asynchronous all-source sensors
with the benefits of resilience against various sensor calibration, modeling, and temporal
faults.
One assumption that is not explicitly discussed in [43] is that ARMAS requires
overlapping state observability [31] to detect anomalous sensor behavior. As discussed
above, the system monitors Kalman pre-update residuals between sensor measurements
and subfilter estimates to continuously judge whether sensor measurements adhered to the
distribution prescribed by the sensor model. Anomalous sensor behaviors (e.g. bias, gain,
model mismatch, high noise, etc.) are only observable if there are other sensors with
comparable observability into the state estimate. If anomalous behavior is detected, the
ARMAS framework attempts to recover the sensor through recalibration, remodeling, and
re-validation. Without overlapping state observability, it is impossible to determine if a
sensor is misbehaving or if it can be re-validated. The criticality of this assumption for
ARMAS is highlighted in the analysis below.
5.2.2

Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring (SAARM) .

SAARM assumes a system form of
ẋ(t) = f [x(t), α(t), u(t), t] + G(t)w(t)
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(5.6)

Figure 5.1: ARMAS Framework State Diagram [43]. A sensor begins at point O (origin)
and is “trusted” or “untrusted”. SAARM and the new contribution SOM reside within the
M (Monitoring) mode.
110

SAARM estimates system states with J separate subfilters. At time t = tk , the system state
vector and state estimation covariance matrix are defined by
[ j]
x̂[ j] (tk ) and Px̂x̂
(tk ) for j = 1...J separate subfilters.

Each of these subfilters is informed by a subset of I − 1 sensors. At t = tk , the ith sensor
provides measurements given by


z[i] (tk ) = h[i] x̂[ j] (tk− ), u(tk ), tk

(5.7)

where h[i] is the nonlinear measurement function, u(tk ) is the control input function, and
v[i] (tk ) is a discrete white noise process of dimension Z × 1 defined by covariance matrix
R[i] (tk ). The pre-update measurement estimate for sensor i from filter j is defined by


ẑ[i, j] (tk ) = h[i] x̂[ j] (tk− ), u(tk ), tk ,

(5.8)

where the estimated covariance matrix is defined by
Pẑẑ [i, j] (tk− ) = H[i] (tk− )Px̂x̂ [ j] (tk− )H[i] (tk− )T .

(5.9)

Using (5.8) and (5.9), the “pre-update residual” vector between sensor i and filter j, r[i, j]
j]
and its covariance matrix, P[i,
rr are defined as

r[i, j] (tk ) = z[i] (tk ) − ẑ[i, j] (tk− ),

(5.10)

[i, j] −
j]
[i]
P[i,
rr (tk ) = R (tk ) + Pẑẑ (tk ).

(5.11)

Fault detection relies on computing a moving average of recent residual-space test statistics
formed by pre-update residual vectors from (5.10) and (5.11). ARMAS is designed to
detect any sensor behavior which is inconsistent with the stated measurement model within
the limitations of the stated significance level, alpha. Although not examined in this chapter
specifically, the ARMAS framework provides additional options for the user to provide
candidate models and/or calibration schemes which could be used to validate and recover
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a failed sensor. The likelihood function focuses on a single residual-space statistic derived
from the Mahalanobis distance, d, given by
d2 = (y − µ)T Σ−1 (y − µ),

(5.12)

where µ and Σ are the mean and covariance of a Zi -dimensional Gaussian distribution. It is
known that a sum of M independent d2 distances follows a χ∗ distribution with Z degrees
of freedom [21] given by
χ∗ =

k+M
X

d2 (t s ),

(5.13)

s=k

d (tk ) = r (tk )[Prr (tk )]−1 r(tk ).
2

T

(5.14)

The set of pre-update residuals is known to be a zero-mean, Gaussian sequence [56]. The
fault detection test for M pre-residuals is composed of the following hypotheses:
H0 : χ∗[i, j] < χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi )

(5.15)

H1 : χ∗[i, j] > χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi )

(5.16)

where α is the probablity of false alarm and M is the number of averaged pre-residual
samples. H0 refers to the hypothesis where the fault is not present in filter j. H1 refers to
the hypothesis where a fault is present in filter j. The resulting hypothesis test forms the
basis of the fault detection algorithm.
Once a fault is detected, a agreement of all other subfilters is utilized to exclude the
faulty sensor. With J = I subfilters, SAARM can only exclude single faults within each
residual monitoring epoch (i.e. M-sample moving average). In this scenario, each subfilter
is informed by a different subset of I − 1 sensors (i.e. each subfilter is missing a single
sensor). SAARM also assumes that all states are observable by all subfilters. In addition
to J = I subfilters, a main filter is maintained to generate a full navigation state estimate
for user output. Accordingly, cross-covariance terms between the main filter and any other
filters are not used for any computation. For this scenario, SAARM provides an axiom for
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fault exclusion: under the assumption that, at most, one sensor can fail simultaneously, at
least one of the J subfilters will be completely unaffected by faulty measurements [43].
The fault consensus is tallied in a T-matrix of dimension I × J and uses the following
convention:






0, Sensor i not associated with filter j







T(i, j) = 
0, χ∗[i, j] < χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi ), No Fault, H0










1, χ∗[i, j] > χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi ), Fault, H1

(5.17)

Figure 5.2 shows the relationship between I sensors and J subfilters required for “fault
agreement“ sensor exclusion. The rows correspond to the i = 1...I sensors and the
columns correspond to the j = 1...J subfilters. Each row contains measurements, Z[i] ,
and the measurement covariance matrix, R[i] , from the ith sensor. Each column contains the
estimated measurement, ẑ[i, j] , and its covariance matrix, Pẑẑ [i, j] .
Based on the stated convention, a fault is declared when T contains a single nonzero
entry (i.e. at least one subfilter detected H1 ). After a fault is declared, SAARM waits for
an agreement from the remaining subfilters until a single fault-free subfilter remains. It is
assumed that the last remaining fault-free subfilter is the one which does not contain the
faulty sensor. After fault exclusion, the fault-free subfilter is elevated to “main filter” status
and the pre-update residual monitoring epoch is restarted with I − 1 total sensors and J − 1
subfilters. Each newly spawned subfilter now contains I − 2 sensors. The faulty sensor
is removed from monitoring mode and follows the state diagram shown in Figure 5.1. Of
note, SAARM is able to detect the occurrence of multiple simultaneous faults but is only
able to provide multiple fault exclusion when initialized with additional subfilter layers.
In summary, SAARM provides all-source sensor FDE and integrity for various sensor
fault types. To provide resiliency to a single fault, ARMAS is required to instantiate and
maintain a quantity of subfilters equal to the quantity of all-source sensors. A separate main
filter is maintained strictly for user output. Fault identification is based on a sequence of χ∗
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Figure 5.2: SAARM T-Matrix for i = 1...I All-Source Sensors [44]. If Sensor 3 were
faulty, for example, each subfilter that includes that sensor would report a fault (all across
row three) and only subfilter 3 would remain consistent. Filter 3 would then be promoted
to the main filter level and a new bank of FDE subfilters must be populated.
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statistical tests of pre-update measurement residuals. Fault exclusion is based on a subfilter
agreement approach which is tallied in a novel T matrix. If every subfilter has position
state observability, then SAARM provides a method for all-source position integrity via
the union of all subfilter position covariance estimates. This integrity concept is based on
the assumption that the framework is able to maintain at least one uncorrupted subfilter.
The next section describes the motivation for a novel layer in ARMAS used for real-time
observability analysis.
5.2.3

Motivation for Stable Observability Monitoring (SOM).

The ARMAS framework with SAARM was originally conceived and simulated
with basic linear 2D position and velocity sensors and assumed fully overlapping state
observability within the FDE layer. All-source sensors, particularly those that only provide
partial state information do not intrinsically exhibit this characteristic. In collaborative
navigation scenarios, retention of autonomy is desirable as long as a stable, resilient
solution can be maintained. Another key motivation for Stable Observability Monitoring
(SOM) is the ability to determine when to augment with collaborative information and
a method to measure the sufficiency of the collaborative information. In early 2020, the
ARMAS framework was applied to a flight test dataset [4] (Figure 5.3). The flight was
conducted by the Autonomy and Navigation Technology (ANT) Center at the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) on 12 October 2018 at Camp Atterbury, IN where a small
Unmanned Aerial System (sUAS) took off and landed at Himsel Army Airfield (HAA).
During the 27-minute dataset, the aircraft flew patterns at approximately 250 and 100
meters above the local surface. The aircraft used the ANT Center’s Scorpion framework
[47] to provide a GNSS/INS-coupled ‘truth’ navigation solution. This analysis consists of
individual pseudorange measurements extracted from six Global Positioning System (GPS)
Satellite Vehicles (SV) for nonlinear processing in ARMAS as individual sensors.
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Figure 5.3: sUAS Flight Test Data, 12 Oct 2018, Camp Atterbury, IN
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Figure 5.4: Trace of a posteriori Layer 1 Subfilter Position Covariance, Simulated Single
GPS 15 Pseudorange Sensor Failure
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Figure 5.5: Trace of a posteriori Layer 2 Subfilter Position Covariance, Simulated Single
GPS 15 Pseudorange Sensor Failure
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For analysis, we configured ARMAS with a sensor package consisting of 6 individual
pseudorange sensors, one for each visible SV. This means each filter in the FDE layer is
equipped with a unique combination of 5 sensors. The latter half of the flight test dataset
contains numerous pseudorange sensor dropouts. During analysis, it was observed that
sensor dropouts tended to cause spurious behavior in ARMAS. This behavior occurs when
less than 5 SVs are visible, meaning each layer 1 subfilter is unable to perform a stable
position state estimate with less than 4 SVs. Further analysis reveals that SAARM is unable
to provide an agreement to identify a failed sensor when the FDE subfilter layer loses
overlapping position state observability. In other words, SAARM can detect a sensor fault
but can not exclude the faulty sensor if even a single FDE layer subfilter loses position state
observability due to dropout, poor geometry, etc. Since the initial simulation of ARMAS
was performed with fully overlapping position state observability in the FDE layer, this
deficiency was overlooked.
Consider a scenario where SV ‘GPS 15’ in a 6-SV constellation is excluded by
ARMAS due to a simulated pseudorange bias at t = 100 sec. Figure 5.4 shows a local
observability analysis for this scenario with the remaining observability subfilters, FDE
layer subfilters, and Main Filter. Note there are 10 layer 2 subfilters remaining (from the
original 15) in the observability layer, corrresponding to 5 remaining SVs (after GPS 15 was
excluded). Note that each layer 2 subfilter in the observability layer is informed by exactly
4 unique pseudorange sensors until GPS 15 is removed. Since 4 unique pseudoranges
are required to constrain a stable 3-D position solution with clock bias estimation, the
unbounded position state covariance matrix indicates a complete loss of observability after
t = 100 sec. As mentioned, a single pseudorange sensor dropout in this scenario will result
in the loss of position state observability and is evidenced by an increase in the position state
covariance estimate. If an additional sensor failure occurs, the decision-making FDE layer
of ARMAS will struggle to provide a subfilter agreement to determine the culprit sensor
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due to a reduction in position state observability. This analysis forms the genesis of local
observability monitoring at the layer 2 “sub-subfilter” level to preserve the consistency of
the layer 1 subfilter FDE and integrity functions of ARMAS.
5.3

Novel Observability Layer 2 “Sub-subfilter” Bank
In the previous section, we began the motivation for monitoring observability at a

layer deeper than the FDE and integrity operations to preserve estimation consistency
and framework resiliency. The uncorrupted subfilter guarantee provided by the ARMAS
framework for a single simultaneous fault enables SAARM to extend a similar guarantee
for all-source position integrity [44]. The previously stated fault exclusion axiom is
extended:
Assuming at least one of the subfilters is informed entirely by properly
modeled, uncorrupted sensors, then at least one subfilter contains consistent
state estimation error statistics [44]. If the states of interest in each layer
2 subfilter are observable and stabilizable, then each layer 1 subfilter
inherits these properties.
This means that the physical region encompassed by the position covariance estimates
of all layer 1 subfilters contains the true navigation state within the statistical significance
of the fault detection tests. That said, SAARM requires overlapping position observability
across all layer 1 subfilters to perform consistent FDE operations and guarantee the
preservation of at least one uncorrupted subfilter for position integrity. For SAARM to
guarantee position state observability at the layer 1 subfilter level, an additional layer of
subfilters is required (Figure 5.6). Each unique subfilter in the observability layer excludes
measurements from two sensors. The purpose of this layer is to provide a means for
observability analysis one layer deeper than the decision-making FDE layer to maintain
resiliency to a single simultaneous sensor fault.
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For example, if a failed sensor is excluded, the FDE layer will be repopulated with
new subfilters, each missing a single unique sensor and the failed sensor. Prior to the sensor
exclusion, a subset of the observability layer contains the set of filters needed to spawn the
new FDE subfilter layer after the exclusion. The purpose of monitoring the observability
one layer deeper than the decision-making FDE layer is to provide a mechanism to warn
the user in the event that a single sensor failure could jeopardize the consistency of the
FDE and integrity operations. This warning comes in the form of a user “observability
warning” to add an additional sensor to the framework. If only a single subfilter in
the FDE layer loses overlapping position observability, SAARM is unable to provide a
subfilter agreement required to identify and exclude the failed sensor. Once overlapping
position observability is lost in the FDE layer, ARMAS can no longer guarantee at least
one consistent uncorrupted subfilter which is required to preserve solution integrity. Due
to potentially variable Fisher information available from all-source navigation sensors, it
is critical that a resilient all-source navigation framework contains a method to monitor
observability prior to corruption of the decision-making FDE layer.
To maintain resilience to F simultaneous sensor failures, the number of concurrent
layer 2 subfilters in the observability filter bank, N, required to monitor observability for I
sensors is
!
I
I!
.
N=
=
(F + 1)(I − (F + 1))!
F+1

(5.18)

As one might expect, the processing requirements to monitor each layer 2 subfilter
position state covariance are non-trivial.

For example, an 8 sensor system requires

28 concurrent SAARM layer 2 subfilters for resiliency to a single simultaneous sensor
failure. When summed with the main filter and 8 traditional subfilters, a total of 37
concurrent estimation filters must be maintained. This method monitors overlapping
position observability at the processing expense of factorial growth in the required quantity
of concurrent estimation filters. A major benefit of this approach is evident in the event
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of a sensor failure. Since a subset of the observability filter bank will form the new FDE
layer, maintenance of these filters in the observability layer eliminates FDE and integrity
operation downtime normally required during FDE layer re-initialization. Additionally, if
we monitor the magnitude of the state estimate variance in each layer 2 subfilter we can
determine which sensors provide critical Fisher information about our state(s) of interest
prior to fault detection and exclusion events.

5.4

Stable Observability Monitoring (SOM)
The ability to maintain stable a posteriori estimates of system states is a primary

indicator of overall estimator stability [31]. A primary goal of observability analysis is to
measure the influence measurements have on system states [56]. Observability analysis has
been applied to fused estimation with a variety of approaches including information matrix
[35], error covariance analysis [73], and others [51] [33] [48]. It is well understood that
a discrete linear time varying system is globally observable if the rank of its observability
matrix M is full rank (i.e. same rank as quantity of states) for all time indices k. The degree
of local observability can be defined as the measure of the singularity of M over a finite set
of k [19]. For linear systems, the observability Gramian can be obtained as a solution of
the the Lyapunov equation [30].
Directly related to the observability Gramian is the Fisher Information matrix which
is a measure of the certainty of the state estimate due to measurement data alone [50] [59]
[67]. The discrete recursive definition of the Fisher information matrix F is

F(tk+ ) = ΦT (tk )F(tk− )Φ(tk ) + HT (tk )R(tk )−1 H(tk )

(5.19)

where the Fisher information contained in a single update at tk is HT (tk )R(tk )−1 H(tk ) which
is the same term used to generate
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P(tk+ )−1 = P(tk− )−1 + HT (tk )R(tk )−1 H(tk ).

(5.20)

This relationship can be leveraged for observability analysis in a nonlinear estimator. If
the system model is stochastically controllable and observable, then P(tk+ ) is uniformly
bounded from above [56]. Stabilizable states have a unique positive-definite P(tk+ ) [56].
By monitoring post-update covariance matrices over time, we can ascertain if the signal to
noise ratio in the system enables stabilized estimation. For the purposes of this chapter,
we focus on the stability of the position states because we are particularly interested
in preserving the consistency of the navigation integrity solution provided by the FDE
sublayer in ARMAS.
The user-defined monitoring epoch for the sum of Mahalanobis distances in (5.13)
adjusts the sensitivity of the SAARM monitoring test within the ARMAS framework [62].
This is a moving average of recent residual-space test statistics formed by pre-update
residual vectors from (5.10) and (5.11). The length of ‘monitoringTime’ (M∆t) is an
ARMAS tuning parameter which is used to adjust for detection sensitivity for temporal
anomalies. The ARMAS ‘monitoringTime’ is designed to contain a sufficient quantity of
samples to meet central limit theorem [65] criteria for the desired α, known as the Type I
error rate (probability of false alarm). The pluggable estimation architecture provided by
SCORPION enables propagation of multiple layers of subfilters. We record and monitor
the post-update position covariances in each n = [1...N] layer 2 subfilter in the observability
bank. An observability flag Ok is set for layer 2 subfilter n for tk according to







1,







Ok,i (n) = 
1,










0,

[n] +
+
if P[n]
j (tk ) > P j (tk−M )β
+
P[n]
j (tk ) > P j,max

otherwise
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(5.21)

+
where P[n]
i (tk ) is the jth diagonal of the post-update state covariance matrix for layer 2
+
subfilter n, Pi (tk−M
) is the post-update variance for state estimate element j for layer 2

subfilter n exactly M samples prior to tk , P j,max a user-defined limit for maximum steadystate state estimate covariance, and β ∈ [1, ∞) is the state estimate covariance transient
growth threshold. If k < M (e.g. a newly initialized filter), an observability flag is not set.
A more compact form used to monitor position states is






[n] +
+ 


1, if tr P[n]
pos (tk ) > tr P pos (tk−M ) β








+ 
Ok,pos (n) = 
1, if tr P[n]

pos (tk ) > tr P pos,max









0, otherwise

(5.22)

+
where P[n]
pos (tk ) is the most recent post-update position covariance matrix for layer 2 subfilter
+
n, P[n]
pos (tk−M ) is the post-update position covariance matrix for layer 2 subfilter n exactly

M samples prior to tk P pos,max is a user-defined limit for maximum steady-state position
state estimate covariance, and β ∈ [1, ∞) is the state estimate covariance transient growth
threshold. The trace is the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix Pk , which represent
+ 
variances of the system state estimates. If the tr P[n]
pos (tk ) converges, then the individual
position estimate variances also converge. When applying (5.22), it is important to ensure
units are identical across the grouped states.
By measuring the difference between the trace of post-update position covariance matrices, we can determine if the position state information contained in the HT (tk )R(tk )−1 H(tk )
terms in the previous M measurements have resulted in a stable mean estimate of all position elements in that subfilter. The user sets β as a tuning parameter for acceptable transient
variance growth per monitoring epoch. To maintain resilience to a sensor failure, a user
prompt to augment ARMAS with an additional sensor is triggered if at least a single layer
2 subfilter observability test sets to 1 (5.23). The newly added sensor will directly en-
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ter monitoring mode if it is considered ‘trusted’ or must pass through sensor validation if
‘untrusted’.

S OMAddNewS ensor








true,
=





 f alse,

if

PN
n=1

Ok (n) > 0
(5.23)

otherwise

where N is the quantity of layer 2 subfilters.
Once a new sensor is successfully added into ARMAS monitoring mode, each layer 2
subfilter gains another sensor. The results of (5.21) or (5.22) are ignored until the newly
requested sensor completes an ARMAS monitoring period after entering monitoring mode.
If post update variance stability is regained after the requisite ARMAS monitoring period,
then (5.21) or (5.22) will set to 0 for each stable layer 2 subfilter and the observability
warning is rescinded. This method flags the presence of an information deficiency with
respect to the estimated states of interest in real-time across multiple layer 2 subfilters in
a novel observability bank which is intended to preserve the consistency of the FDE and
integrity operations in ARMAS.
5.5

State Estimate Covariance Transient Growth Threshold (Beta) and Maximum
State Estimate Covariance Limits
The state estimate covariance transient growth threshold, β ∈ [1, ∞), sets SOM

framework sensitivity to transient loss of Fisher information for the state(s) of interest
(5.21). The maximum state estimate covariance limit is simply an upper bound for state
estimate covariance and is designed to set a minimum steady-state information threshold
for the framework. The validation gate employed by SAARM is a moving window of
residual-space test statistics in the form of Mahalanobis distances. The power of SAARM’s
chi-squared distributed hypothesis test is dependent on the ARMAS framework’s ability
to produce a stable and consistent pre-update residual covariance matrix, Σ (5.14). By
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operating SOM’s state estimate covariance monitoring scheme in the layer 2 sublayer (See
Figure 5.6), we are able to peek forward at framework stability in the event of a single
unknown sensor failure.
Since the pre-update residual covariance matrix is a function of the state estimate
covariance and the observation model in (5.9), the post-update state estimate covariance
P+ is a direct indicator for estimator observability and stabilizability [56]. The least
stabilizable layer 2 subfilter is informed by exactly 1 fewer sensor than the least stabilizable
layer 1 subfilter. By monitoring the layer 2 subfilter level, this allows for a sensor
augmentation request before a potential loss of stability in the FDE operations. Since Ti matrix exclusion operations employed by SAARM require a unanimous fault agreement to
exclude a failed sensor (5.17), it is particularly important that the stability of the layer 1
subfilter estimates is ensured. Furthermore, since ARMAS navigation integrity is provided
by the union of the layer 1 subfilter position covariance ellipses, position integrity can be
stabilized if the position states are selected as the SOM states of interest.
A selection of β = 1.0 is the most sensitive case which results in a request for
an additional sensor when any layer 2 subfilter state estimate covariance grows by any
amount in a single ARMAS monitoring epoch according to (5.23). This extreme case
will maximize use of available offboard information. In the opposite case, large values
of β will produce a less sensitive framework without a tendency to request additional
sensor augmentation, where β → ∞ performs identically to legacy ARMAS. For initial
implementation, we recommend beginning with a small value for β ≈ 3.0. This tuning
parameter should be adjusted by the user to set the desired balance between autonomy and
framework estimation stability for the state(s) of interest. The next section describes a set
of reconfigurable GNSS scenarios used to assess the effectiveness of SOM.
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5.6

Simulation
This section describes a set of four example 3-D scenarios designed to assess the

impacts of SOM on ARMAS FDE operations and untrusted sensor validation. Individual
SVs are arranged in random stationary GNSS constellations in a local tangential frame
(LTF). In scenarios 1-4, we initialize three aircraft operating a standard EKF, ARMAS,
and ARMAS-SOM (5.22) with 4, 5, 6, and 7 trusted pseudorange sensors, respectively.
We assume the remaining untrusted SVs are available for augmentation via SOM. The
availability of additional untrusted sensor information can be analagous to offboard
augmentation in a collaborative navigation scenario. Each constellation contains 1 SV
directly overhead and 9 SVs evenly distributed in azimuth with discrete random uniform
elevations between 45 and 63.4 degrees (See Fig. 5.7). Each scenario consists of two
sensor anomalies introduced at fixed times: (1) a growing pseudorange bias (linear ranging
ramp) from t = 240 to t = 330 sec on a trusted sensor and (2) validation of an untrusted
pseudorange sensor with a constant 40 meter bias at t = 360 sec. The growing pseudorange
bias on the trusted sensor is used to assess FDE in monitoring mode (i.e. how large is the
bias before it is detected and excluded). The constant bias is used to measure probability
of detection in validation mode after recovery from a sensor exclusion.
Consider a 3-D example with two vehicles obtaining their navigation solutions from
an EKF within the ARMAS framework

 

 

 

 
ẋ p (t)  ẋv (t)   0 

 

 
ẋ(t) =  ẋv (t)  =  ẋa (t)  +  0 

 

 

 

  1
w(t)
ẋa (t)
− τa ẋv (t)

(5.24)

where xp is the vehicle’s position (m), xv is the vehicle’s velocity (m/s), xa is the
vehicle’s acceleration (m/s2 ), and τa = 90 seconds is a time-constant associated with a
First-order Gauss-Markov (FOGM) process. A 3-D white noise process is given by w(t)

127

where E[w(t) w(t+τ)T ] = Qδ(τ) and
Q = (1.0 × 10−2 )2 I3×3 (m2 /s4 )

(5.25)

The model from (5.24) is used to generate randomly initialized vehicle trajectories for
each trial. Initial velocities and accelerations are Normally distributed with σaccel = 1×10−2
(m/s2 ) and σvel = 5 (m/s). Figure 5.8 shows 300 sample truth trajectories for this scenario.
Each vehicle is initialized identically with initial state and covariance estimates:

T
x̂(0) = 0 0 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,



2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
P(0) = diag 30 30 30 10 10 10 0.01 0.01 0.01 .

(5.26)

(5.27)

Each aircraft receives discrete measurements from a constellation of stationary
satellite vehicles (SV). Although there are 10 SVs (labelled GPS1-10), the aircraft are
initialized with a trusted subset of this constellation varying from 4 to 7 SVs.

An

additional fixed satellite with a random uniform elevation between 45 and 63.4 degrees
is introduced at t = 360 sec and is corrupted with a constant 40 meter pseudorange range
bias. This constellation is designed to provide coverage at high elevation angles between
approximately 45 degrees and 63.4 degrees with a single satellite directly overhead (Figure
5.7).
Individual pseudorange measurements are performed according to (5.28)

ρi =

p
(XS V,i − Xu ) + (YS V,i − Yu ) + (ZS V,i − Zu ) + bu ,

(5.28)

where ρi is the pseudorange to SV i, with fixed coordinates (XS V , YS V , ZS V ), estimated
user coordinates are (Xu , Yu , Zu ), and an estimated GNSS receiver clock bias is bu .
The pseudorange measurement covariance RS V = 102 m2 . A receiver clock bias bu is
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independently estimated as an additional state in each EKF. All coordinates are expressed
in the LTF.
Pseudorange measurements, ẑ = h(x̂), are performed according to (5.30) for the
estimated position states (Xu , Yu , Zu , bu ) within x̂. The measurement Jacobian H is:


 −(Xi,S V −Xu )

ri


H =  ...

 −(Xn,S V −Xu )
rn

−(Yi,S V −Yu )
ri

−(Zi,S V −Zu )
ri

...

...

−(Yn,S V −Yu )
rn

−(Zn,S V −Zu )
rn



1


1


1

(5.29)

where
ri =

p
(XS V,i − Xu ) + (YS V,i − Yu ) + (ZS V,i − Zu )

(5.30)

is the distance from the platform to an SV.
In addition to initial pseudorange sensors, additional unbiased pseudorange sensors
may be requested automatically by SOM at any time during the scenario. The other two
approaches (legacy ARMAS, EKF) are limited to the sensors provided during initialization.
In this respect, SOM has a clear advantage over the two legacy approaches. The point of
this analysis is to show that ARMAS-SOM can detect a threat to navigation resilience,
provide timely sensor augmentation, and successfully preserve the consistency of the FDE
and validation operations in ARMAS. In the middle of the scenario, an insidious growing
position bias is injected into a single trusted pseudorange sensor to test the ARMAS FDE
process. The size of the position bias at exclusion is recorded. Near the end of the scenario,
an untrusted pseudorange sensor with a fixed bias is added into validation at t = 360 sec to
test ARMAS sensor validation.

5.7

Numerical Results
The following section presents the results for three identical aircraft (EKF, ARMAS,

and ARMAS-SOM equipped) in four scenarios with 4, 5, 6, and 7 initial trusted
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pseudorange sensors.

We assume the remaining untrusted SVs are available for

augmentation via SOM. The maximum position state estimate covariance threshold is set
to P pos,max = diag3×3 (202 m2 ) (5.22). The acceptable steady state variance growth term β
from (5.22) is set to 3.0 for all runs. This was achieved by initially setting β to 1.0 and
incrementally increasing until desired sensitivity is achieved.
In each scenario, a single trusted pseudorange sensor experiences a sensor anomaly
(linear ramp) from t = 240 to 330 sec and an untrusted biased sensor (40 meters) is added at
t = 360 sec. The EKF simply trusts all information provided, has no ability to detect faults
nor perform sensor validation, and is included only as a performance baseline. ARMAS
is equipped with FDE capabilities and validation of untrusted sensors. The ARMAS
recalibration and remodeling modes are not active. ARMAS-SOM includes all of the
aforementioned ARMAS capabilities and adds the ability to request additional untrusted
pseudorange sensors at any time. SOM monitors the stability of the state covariance
estimates in the observability subfilters (layer 2) (5.22). Since each observability layer
subfilter exclude 2 sensors, the minimum number of pseudorange sensors at the user output
level (layer 0) is 6. If one of the trusted sensors is excluded, the quantity of sensors at the
top level must remain at least 6 to ensure stability at the layer 2 subfilter level.
5.7.1

Scenario 1.

In scenario 1, each aircraft is initialized with 4 trusted pseudorange sensors receiving
information from a random stationary constellation of SVs in the LTF. A summary of
the results is shown in Table 5.1. Clearly, ARMAS-SOM outperforms both ARMAS and
the EKF, especially in terms of RSS error and detection rate for a biased sensor. This is
expected because ARMAS-SOM augments itself with 2 additional untrusted pseudorange
sensors using the ARMAS validation process prior to the sensor anomaly event at t = 240
sec. Once the spoofed sensor is excluded, ARMAS-SOM requests one additional untrusted
sensor to stabilize the observability layer prior to validation of the untrusted biased sensor.
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This results in a total of 3 added pseudorange sensors for a total of 7. With ARMAS, the
exclusion of the spoofed sensor results in only 3 pseudorange sensors which is insufficient
to provide a stable 3-D position estimate with clock bias estimation. This is evidenced by
the large growth in estimated standard error at approx. t = 245 sec in Figure 5.9. Figure
5.10 shows the mean RSS error and standard deviation for 1000 Monte Carlo trials. It is
clear that ARMAS does not recover well from the exclusion of the spoofed sensor with a
bias detection rate of 0.01 is clearly outperformed by ARMAS-SOM with a detection rate
of 0.99. The EKF simply trusts all information provided and the navigation solution is
carried off by the linear ramp sensor anomaly.

4 Trusted SVs, 1000 Trials
Algorithm

Grand Mean RSS Error [m]

Mean GPS4 Anomaly

Detection Rate for

Mean Total

Magnitude at Exclusion [m]

40 meter Bias

Added Sensors

Std. Dev. [m]
(Median)

EKF

916.0 (76.53)

1,720.8

–

–

–

ARMAS

694.3 (76.52)

684.3

44.53

0.01

–

SOM

16.78 (10.15)

18.25

41.51

0.99

3.00

Table 5.1: Scenario 1 Results: RSS Error, GPS4 Exclusion Magnitude, Detection Rate,
and Quantity of Augmented Sensors
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Figure 5.9: Scenario 1 State Estimation Error for 1 Run with Sensor Anomaly from t = 240
to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec
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Figure 5.10: Scenario 1 Mean 3-D RSS Error ± 1-σ for 1000 Runs with Sensor Anomaly
from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec

5.7.2

Scenario 2.

In scenario 2, each aircraft is initialized with 5 trusted pseudorange sensors. A
summary of the results is shown in Table 5.2. ARMAS-SOM outperforms both ARMAS
and the EKF. Figure 5.12 shows the improvement in estimation performance achieved by
ARMAS-SOM sensor augmentation at approximately t = 70 sec. This is also visible at
approximately t = 70 sec with the estimated standard error estimates in Figure 5.11. Once
the spoofed sensor is excluded, ARMAS-SOM requests one additional untrusted sensor to
stabilize the observability layer prior to validation of the unstrusted biased sensor. This
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results in a total of 2 added pseudorange sensors for a total of 7. With ARMAS, the
exclusion of the spoofed sensor results in 4 pseudorange sensors which is sufficient to
provide a stable 3-D position estimate with clock bias estimation at the main filter level.
Figure 5.10 shows the mean RSS error and standard deviation for 1000 Monte Carlo trials.
It is clear that ARMAS and ARMAS-SOM performance is closer and while ARMAS
maintains a stable solution, it has difficulty with proper validation of the untrusted biased
sensor with a detection rate of 0.58 and is outperformed by ARMAS-SOM with a detection
rate of 0.99. The EKF simply trusts all information provided and the navigation solution is
exploited by the biased information.

5 Trusted SVs, 1000 Trials
Algorithm

Grand Mean [m]

Mean GPS4 Anomaly

Detection Rate for

Mean Total

Magnitude at Exclusion [m]

40 meter Bias

Added Sensors

Std. Dev. [m]
(Median)

EKF

283.5 (36.42)

411.3

–

–

–

ARMAS

39.07 (22.44)

34.22

40.36

0.58

–

SOM

12.14 (9.48)

7.25

37.93

1.00

2.00

Table 5.2: Scenario 2 Results: RSS Error, GPS4 Exclusion Magnitude, Detection Rate,
and Quantity of Augmented Sensors
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Figure 5.11: Scenario 2 State Estimation Error for 1 Run with Linear Pseudorange Ramp
Bias from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec
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Figure 5.12: Scenario 2 Mean 3-D RSS Error ± 1-σ for 1000 Runs with Sensor Linear
Pseudorange Ramp Bias from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec

5.7.3

Scenario 3.

In scenario 3, each aircraft is initialized with 6 trusted pseudorange sensors. A
summary of the results is shown in Table 5.3. ARMAS-SOM outperforms both ARMAS
and the EKF. Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show that ARMAS and ARMAS-SOM performance
is nearly identical until ARMAS-SOM augments with an additional untrusted sensor at
approximately t = 310 sec after spoofed sensor exclusion. This results in a total of 1
added pseudorange sensor for a total of 7. With ARMAS, the exclusion of the spoofed
sensor results in 5 pseudorange sensors at the main filter level which is sufficient to provide
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a stable 3-D position estimate with clock bias estimation in each layer 1 subfilter (each
containing 4 pseudorange sensors). With an increase in information, it is clear that ARMAS
performance is closer to ARMAS-SOM than in Scenario 2. ARMAS maintains a stable
solution but has difficulty with proper validation of the untrusted biased sensor with a
detection rate of 0.85 and is outperformed by ARMAS-SOM with a detection rate of 1.00.
The EKF simply trusts all information provided and the navigation solution is exploited by
the biased information.

6 Trusted SVs, 1000 Trials
Algorithm

Grand Mean [m]

Mean GPS4 Anomaly

Detection Rate for

Mean Total

Magnitude at Exclusion [m]

40 meter Bias

Added Sensors

Std. Dev. [m]
(Median)

EKF

153.7 (25.11)

213.6

–

–

–

ARMAS

17.73 (12.94)

9.00

38.44

0.85

–

SOM

12.34 (11.76)

3.97

38.44

1.00

1.00

Table 5.3: Scenario 3 Results: RSS Error, GPS4 Exclusion Magnitude, Detection Rate,
and Quantity of Augmented Sensors
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Figure 5.13: Scenario 3 State Estimation Error for 1 Run with Sensor Linear Pseudorange
Ramp Bias from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec
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Figure 5.14: Scenario 3 Mean 3-D RSS Error ± 1-σ for 1000 Runs with Sensor Linear
Pseudorange Ramp Bias from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec

5.7.4

Scenario 4.

In scenario 4, each aircraft is initialized with 7 trusted pseudorange sensors. A
summary of the results is shown in Table 5.4. ARMAS-SOM performs identically to
ARMAS and both outperform the EKF. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show that ARMAS and
ARMAS-SOM performance is practically identical. ARMAS-SOM does not request any
sensor augmentation for a total of 7 pseudorange sensors. The EKF simply trusts all
information provided and the navigation solution is exploited by the biased information.
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7 Trusted SVs, 1000 Trials
Algorithm

Grand Mean [m]

Mean GPS4 Anomaly

Detection Rate for

Mean Total

Magnitude at Exclusion [m]

40 meter Bias

Added Sensors

Std. Dev. [m]
(Median)

EKF

85.52 (20.5)

113.4

–

–

–

ARMAS

11.04 (10.08)

2.55

36.75

0.99

–

SOM

11.04 (10.08)

2.55

36.75

0.99

0.00

Table 5.4: Scenario 4 Results: RSS Error, GPS4 Exclusion Magnitude, Detection Rate,
and Quantity of Augmented Sensors
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Figure 5.15: Scenario 4 State Estimation Error for 1 Run with Sensor Linear Pseudorange
Ramp Bias from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec
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Figure 5.16: Scenario 4 Mean 3-D RSS Error ± 1-σ for 1000 Runs with Sensor Linear
Pseudorange Ramp Bias from t = 240 to 330 sec and Biased Sensor added at t = 360 sec

5.7.5

Across Scenarios.

Figure 5.17 shows a summary of detection rates for each of the four 1000-run
scenarios. Clearly, ARMAS validation consistency is a function of stable observability in
the FDE (layer 1) subfilters. In order guarantee resilience to a single simultaneous sensor
failure, stable observability must be established at the Observability (layer 2) subfilters.

5.8

Chapter Summary and Future Work
This chapter addresses a critical vulnerability of ARMAS and provides a convenient

method to monitor real-time navigation resilience and eliminate subfilter respawn
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downtime in the event of a sensor failure. This method presents a novel “observability
bank” operating in a layer of I choose 2 subfilters. These additions to ARMAS provide
real-time stable observability analysis via monitoring of the layer 2 subfilter a posteriori
covariance matrices.
The ARMAS framework was originally developed with linear 2D position and
velocity sensors which provided fully overlapping position observability. Initial analysis
of ARMAS with GNSS pseudorange data from a sUAS flight test at Camp Atterbury, IN
showed that ARMAS operations can become inconsistent if the FDE layer subfilters lose
overlapping position estimation observability. SOM monitors each layer 2 subfilter for both
observability and stabilizability.
To maintain resilience to a single simultaneous sensor failure, we must assume that
a single sensor may fail at any time. Since the “observability” bank contains a subset of
subfilters which will form the new FDE layer after a sensor exclusion, the observable and
stabilizable properties guaranteed by SOM are inherited by the newly formed FDE layer.
Furthermore, SOM provides the user with a timely warning to augment with additional
sensor data and provides a notification when the augmented sensor information is sufficient
for resilience to a single simultaneous sensor failure. A Monte Carlo analysis of four
example scenarios proves that a loss of overlapping position observability in the FDE layer
can result in an inability to exclude a failed sensor and inadvertent validation of a corrupted
sensor, resulting in undetected corruption of the main navigation solution. SOM is shown
provide instrinsic awareness about underlying overlapping observability assumptions made
by ARMAS. With sensor augmentation, these assumptions can be preserved to guarantee
ARMAS framework resilience to a single simultaneous sensor failure and is proven by the
preservation of the ARMAS FDE and validation processes.
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Figure 5.6: ARMAS Framework with Novel Observability Layer for Resiliency to One
Simultaneous Sensor Failure.
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Figure 5.7: Sample of 10-SV Stationary Constellation Skyplot with Discrete Random
Uniform Elevations and 1 Satellite Directly Overhead
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Figure 5.8: Sample Truth Trajectories, 300 Runs
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Figure 5.17: Summary of Detection Rates for 40 meter Biased Pseudorange Sensor
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VI.

A Framework for Resilient Collaborative All-source Navigation

The ARMAS-SOM framework fuses collaborative all-source sensor information in
a resilient manner with fault detection, exclusion, and integrity solutions recognizable
to a GNSS user. This framework uses a multi-filter residual monitoring approach for
fault detection and exclusion which is augmented with an additional “observability” EKF
sub-layer for resilience. We monitor the aposteriori state covariances in this sub-layer
to provide intrinsic awareness when navigation state observability assumptions required
for integrity are in danger. The framework leverages this to selectively augment with
offboard information and preserve resilience. By maintaining split parallel collaborative
and proprioceptive instances of ARMAS-SOM and employing the “stingy collaboration”
technique, we are able maximize efficient use of network resources, limit the propagation
of unknown corruption to a single donor, and maintain consistent collaborative navigation
without fear of double-counting in a scalable processing footprint. Lastly, we preserve the
ability to return to autonomy and are able to use the same intrinsic awareness to notify the
user when it is safe to do so.

6.1

Introduction
Due to widespread awareness of GNSS vulnerabilities, there is increased interest

in alternative navigation technologies such as visual [77], signals of opportunity [20],
magnetic [13], and others [23][63][22]. The fusion of these information sources for
localization is known as all-source navigation [74]. Since all-source sensors typically
reside on individual vehicles connected in a distributed wireless network, consistent
collaborative fusion of this decentralized information is highly desired.
A primary navigation user requirement is a timely and accurate estimate of navigation
error to include impending degradation known as navigation integrity [44] which is
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Figure 6.1:

The ARMAS-SOM framework provides intrinsic all-source resilience

“awareness” via novel selective offboard collaboration which improves navigation integrity
and facilitates graceful recovery to autonomy.

149

currently provided through GNSS techniques such as Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM) [8]. With GNSS navigation, simultaneously redundant, synchronous
measurements with validated measurement models are readily available. With all-source
navigation, none of these are guaranteed. In 2018, ARMAS [43] was introduced to
provide a generalized framework to fuse all-source sensor information which leveraged
SCORPION pluggable Bayesian estimators to gracefully manage multiple concurrent state
estimation subfilters [46]. In 2019, the monitoring mode of the ARMAS framework was
redesigned to provide a means for all-source integrity, known as SAARM [44].
The following section provides a brief history of all-source navigation to provide
context for this research. We continue with brief overviews of classical model estimation,
residual monitoring and applicability to multi-sensor FDE. The background section ends
with a brief explanation of estimator credibility. These concepts are fundamental to
the ARMAS framework [43] which is augmented by Stable Observability Monitoring
(SOM) [25]. The next section describes methods for managing cross-correlation and
introduces split collaborative and proprioceptive ARMAS-SOM modules which enable
consistent collaborative augmentation with the option to gracefully recover autonomy.
These improvements are simulated in a 3D all-source navigation environment which
demonstrates collaborative estimator credibility, resilience to loss of state observability,
and navigation error improvement.
6.2

Background
6.2.1

Recursive Bayesian Estimation.

Small cumulative measurement errors form an integration bias or “drift”, the primary
error source for an INS. Some form of recursive model estimation, like an EKF, is often
used to maintain an INS error model. This strategy incorporates trusted external GNSS
and/or geodetic measurements to periodically correct integration bias. Navigation is based
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on accurate estimation of a vehicle’s system states. This is accomplished via a task called
model estimation.
Modern navigation, based on recursive model estimation, can trace its roots to the KF
algorithm [45], presented in 1960. In a Kalman filter, the system states, x, are estimated
recursively in real-time by propagating a state estimate, x̂, and associated state covariance,
P. The process (dynamics) model is given by
ẋ(t) = Fx(t) + Bu(t) + Gw(t),

(6.1)

E[w(t)] = 0,

(6.2)

E[w(t)w(t)T (t + τ] = Qδ(τ),

(6.3)

with

where x is the system state vector, u is the system input control vector, and w is a vector
of white noise components. E is the expectation operator, t is system time, and τ is a time
offset. F, B, and G are linear operator matrices for the state vector, control input vector,
and noise vector, respectively.
In 1978, the Van Loan method was introduced [76] to provide a method to discretize
6.1 and 6.3 for use in digital, time-sampled computer systems. The resulting discrete
process noise strength matrix, Qd , discrete control input matrix, Bd , and discrete state
transition matrix, Φ, are calculated by linearizing the system about a single time sample,
∆t.
Assuming state estimate observability, measurements, z, and associated measurement
covariances, R, are used to perform a state estimate update. The measurements are mapped
to the states by the observation model, H. The discrete measurement model is given by
zk = Hxk + vk

(6.4)

E[vk ] = 0,

(6.5)

where
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E[vk vTk+∆t ] = Rδk,k+∆t ,

(6.6)

and z is the sensor measurement vector. The discrete Kalman filter is initialized with state
estimates, x0 , and associated initial state covariance P0 . The initial state estimate of x̂ is
propagated in the discrete Kalman filter using
x̂−k+1 = Φx̂+k + Bd uk ,

(6.7)

P−k+1 = ΦP+k ΦT + Qd .

(6.8)

This update is performed by optimally combining the stochastic components of the state
estimate and of the measurements via the Kalman gain, K, using
Kk = P−k HT [HPk HT + R]−1 ,

(6.9)

x̂+k = x̂−k + Kk [zk − Hx̂−k ],

(6.10)

P+k = (I − Kk H)P−k .

(6.11)

With properly modeled state-transition and measurement models, the result is optimal
stochastic estimation of the vehicle states.

The state-transition model makes use of

mathematical relationships between system states to provide additional observability to
states which cannot be directly measured. Recursive estimation is the primary means of
model estimation used by this research to approach the all-source navigation problem.
6.2.2

Residual Monitoring.

This brief overview of residual monitoring based on a likelihood function for a Kalman
filter or EKF is based on a more thorough introduction [56]. Residual monitoring is a useful
technique for sensor fault detection. The goal of this section is to set the stage for a later
explanation of the SAARM algorithm implemented by the ARMAS framework. After a
sensor measurement z is obtained, it is possible to extract a set of pre-update KF residuals,
r, at time k, resulting in
rk = zk − Hx̂−k .
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(6.12)

If we apply Gaussian white-noise assumptions, the expected statistical distribution of these
residuals is


rk ,→ N 0, HP−k HT + R ,

(6.13)

which results in a Gaussian-Normal probability density function given by
p(rk |Σk ) = √

1
1
T −1
e− 2 (rk ) Σk (rk ) and
|2πΣk |

Σk = HP−k HT + R.

(6.14)
(6.15)

If we assume a set of N residuals have been collected preceding tk , the resulting likelihood
function is given by
L Nk =

k
Y

1
p

j=k−N+1

|2πΣ j |

e− 2 (r j )
1

T −1
Σj

(r j ) .

(6.16)

In lieu of differentiation, this expression can be simplified by taking advantage of
the monotonically increasing natural logarithm function, resulting in the log-likelihood
function given by
L Nk =

k
X

1
− log(|2πΣi |) − rTi Σ−1
i ri .
2
i=k−N+1

(6.17)

If we examine a residual vector rk containing the N most recent residuals, the log-likelihood
function acts as a moving window to compile the cumulative statistical likelihood for this
set. A predefined threshold can be used to determine if the set of residuals falls outside the
expected distribution which would trigger a failure detection. This forms the basis for the
fault detection and exclusion algorithm espoused by ARMAS-SOM.
6.3

Autonomous Resilient Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS)
Introduced in 2018, ARMAS provides a generalized framework for real-time

management of heterogeneous, asynchronous all-source sensors [43]. This framework
is resilient to corruption from mismodeled, uncalibrated, and faulty sensors and is
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accomplished by combining sensor validation, FDE, recalibration, and remodeling modes
in a single architecture. ARMAS employs a set of SCORPION pluggable EKF estimators
to address the following nonlinear navigation problem:
ẋ(t) = f [x(t), (t), u(t), t] + G(t)w(t)

(6.18)

where x is a N × 1 state vector of a vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude. The
measurement error states vector  is of dimension M × 1, u is the control input vector,
G is an (N + M) × W linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white noise process defined by a
W × W continuous process noise strength matrix, Q.
The state estimates are propagated through optimally combining the state process
model, sensor-specific calibration parameters, and measurement updates from j = 1...J
available all-source sensors. The measurement model for the jth sensor is described by:


z[kj] = h[ j] x(t),  [ j] (t), u(t), t, p[ j] + v[kj] ,

(6.19)

where h[ j] is the nonlinear measurement function for the jth sensor,  [j] is an L × 1 subset
of  which contains additional error states needed to process sensor measurements, p[j] is a
P × 1 user-selectable model parameter vector for h[ j] , and vk is a Z × 1 discrete white noise
process with covariance defined by matrix R[kj] .
The Z × 1 measurement residual for sensor j, r[kj] is defined by


r[kj] = z[kj] − h[ j] x̂−k ,b
k[ j]− , uk , tk , p̂[kj] ,

(6.20)

where x̂−k , b
k[ j]− , and p̂[kj] are estimated quantities. Assuming white Gaussian noise, the
measurement residual from 6.20 is expected to follow the distribution


r[kj] ,→ N 0N×1 , S[kj] ,
T

S[kj] = H[kj] P−k H[kj] + R[kj] ,

(6.21)
(6.22)

where P−k is the (N + M) × (N + M) state estimate error covariance matrix at time tk and
T

H[kj] is the Z × (N + M) Jacobian of h[ j] .
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Sensors are initialized in one of two modes: trusted or untrusted. Untrusted sensors
are required to enter a sensor validation mode prior to being brought into monitoring mode.
In validation mode, ARMAS employs a likelihood function described by (6.17) to monitor
the statistical distribution of a user-defined monitoring period composed of recent Kalman
pre-update residuals. A chi-square, χ∗ , test statistic is used to detect excursions outside a
user-defined threshold across the sampling period. Sensors in validation mode are excluded
from impacting the main state estimates. Trusted sensors are directly brought online into
monitoring mode. In monitoring mode, sensor measurements are allowed to update the
main state estimates. ARMAS employs the same pre-update residual likelihood function
used in the validation mode to monitor sensor performance. A detailed explanation of
monitoring mode, including FDE and integrity functions is given in section 6.3.1.
Once a fault is detected, the sensor is no longer “trusted” and is quarantined from
affecting the core navigation state estimate, x̂[ j] . ARMAS attempts to reinitialize the sensor
via validation mode. If this fails, ARMAS attempts to repair and recover the faulty sensor
via two separate modes: sensor calibration and remodeling.
In calibration mode, user-selectable sensor parameters, p[ j] and/or  [ j] are estimated
using residual monitoring from trusted sensors that have observability of x. If there is
a single calibration parameter, ARMAS attempts to correct the calibration using residual
monitoring and sends the sensor back to validation mode. If linked extrinsic calibration
parameters exist, (e.g. camera lever arm and camera orientation within p[ j] or  [ j] ), these
are estimated individually and sequenced based on convergence of the state covariance
matrix to maintain state observability.
If the recalibrated sensor fails to pass sensor validation, the sensor enters remodeling
mode where ARMAS attempts to modify the measurement model, h[ j] , based on 1...S
user-defined measurement models. S concurrent filters are spawned (each with a unique
measurement model), and an epoch of measurement residuals is gathered against the core
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navigation estimate x. The ‘winning’ sensor measurement model is selected based on
which filter best matches the prescribed distribution (6.21) during the residual epoch. The
sensor then enters validation mode. If the remodeling mode does not result in a new model
selection, and RSR is activated, the sensor periodically re-enters validation mode after a
user-selectable time period in an attempt to overcome a temporal anomaly. Figure 6.2 is
a state transition diagram depiction of these modes. The result is a framework compatible
with heterogeneous, asynchronous all-source sensors with the benefits of resilience against
various sensor calibration, modeling, and temporal faults.
One assumption that is not explicitly discussed in [43] is that ARMAS requires
overlapping state observability [31] to detect anomalous sensor behavior. As discussed
above, the system monitors Kalman pre-update residuals between sensor measurements
and subfilter estimates to continuously judge whether sensor measurements adhered to the
distribution prescribed by the sensor model. Anomalous sensor behaviors (e.g. bias, gain,
model mismatch, high noise, etc.) are only observable if there are other sensors with
comparable observability into the state estimate. If anomalous behavior is detected, the
ARMAS framework attempts to recover the sensor through recalibration, remodeling, and
re-validation. Without overlapping state observability, it is impossible to determine if a
sensor is misbehaving or if it can be re-validated.
6.3.1

Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring (SAARM) .

As previously alluded, the monitoring mode in ARMAS was redesigned in 2019 with
a special form of residual monitoring. SAARM is designed to detect multiple sensor
failure modes: bias, mismatched model, and/or miscalibration. For resilience to a single
faulty sensor, this approach requires the designer to maintain J = I differently configured
navigation subfilters (one for each sensor). This is later extended to provide resiliency to
multiple simultaneous faults (at the expense of processing power). The key to SAARM’s
FDE and integrity functions is the use of overlapping state observability to detect a faulty
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Figure 6.2: ARMAS Framework State Diagram [43]
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sensor. The pluggable Bayesian filters provided by the SCORPION estimation architecture
afford needed flexibility to spawn, propagate, and remove multiple concurrent filters on
the fly. The following section summarizes SAARM’s fault detection, fault exclusion, and
all-source integrity methods.
SAARM assumes a system form of
ẋ(t) = f [x(t), (t), u(t), t] + G(t)w(t)

(6.23)

where x is a N × 1 state vector of a vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude. The
measurement error states vector  is of dimension M × 1, u is the control input vector,
G is an (N + M) × W linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white noise process defined by a
W × W continuous process noise strength matrix, Q. SAARM estimates system states with
J separate subfilters. At time t = tk , the system state vector and state estimation covariance
matrix are defined by
[ j]
x̂[ j] (tk ) and Px̂x̂
(tk ) for j = 1...J separate subfilters.

Each of these subfilters is informed by a subset of I − 1 sensors. At t = tk , the ith sensor
provides measurements given by


z[i] (tk ) = h[i] x̂[ j] (tk− ), u(tk ), tk

(6.24)

where h[i] is the nonlinear measurement function, u(tk ) is the control input function, and
v[i] (tk ) is a discrete white noise process of dimension Zi × 1 defined by covariance matrix
R[i] (tk ). The pre-update measurement estimate for sensor i from filter j is defined by


ẑ[i, j] (tk ) = h[i] x̂[ j] (tk− ), u(tk ), tk ,

(6.25)

where the estimated covariance matrix is defined by
Pẑẑ [i, j] (tk− ) = H[i] (tk− )Px̂x̂ [ j] (tk− )H[i] (tk− )T .
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(6.26)

Using (6.25) and (6.26), the “pre-update residual” vector between sensor i and filter j, r[i, j]
j]
and its covariance matrix, P[i,
rr are defined as

r[i, j] (tk ) = z[i] (tk ) − ẑ[i, j] (tk− ),

(6.27)

[i, j] −
j]
[i]
P[i,
rr (tk ) = R (tk ) + Pẑẑ (tk ).

(6.28)

Fault detection relies on computing a moving average of recent residual-space test statistics
formed by pre-update residual vectors from (6.27) and (6.28). ARMAS is designed to
detect three categories of faults: (1) a bias, (2) an incorrectly stated noise covariance, or
(3) an incorrectly stated measurement model. The likelihood function focuses on a single
residual-space statistic derived from the Mahalanobis distance, d, given by
d2 = (y − µ)T Σ−1 (y − µ),

(6.29)

where µ and Σ are the mean and covariance of a Zi -dimensional Gaussian distribution. It is
known that a sum of M independent d2 distances follows a χ∗ distribution with Z degrees
of freedom [21] given by
χ =
∗

k+M
X

d2 (t s ),

(6.30)

s=k

d2 (tk ) = rT (tk )[Prr (tk )]−1 r(tk ).

(6.31)

The set of pre-update residuals is known to be a zero-mean, white sequence [56]. The fault
detection test for M pre-residuals is composed of the following hypotheses:
H0 : χ∗[i, j] < χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi )

(6.32)

H1 : χ∗[i, j] > χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi )

(6.33)

where α is the probablity of false alarm and M is the number of averaged pre-residual
samples. H0 refers to the hypothesis where the fault is not present in filter j. H1 refers to
the hypothesis where a fault is present in filter j. The resulting hypothesis test forms the
basis of the fault detection algorithm.
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Once a fault is detected, a consensus of multiple subfilters is utilized to exclude the
faulty sensor. With J = I subfilters, SAARM can only exclude single faults within each
residual monitoring epoch (i.e. M-sample moving average). In this scenario, each subfilter
is informed by a different subset of I − 1 sensors (i.e. each subfilter is missing a single
sensor). SAARM also assumes that all states are observable by all subfilters. In addition
to J = I subfilters, a main filter is maintained to generate a full navigation state estimate
for user output. Accordingly, cross-covariance terms between the main filter and any other
filters are not used for any computation. For this scenario, SAARM provides an axiom for
fault exclusion: under the assumption that, at most, one sensor can fail simultaneously, at
least one of the J subfilters will be completely unaffected by faulty measurements [43].
The fault consensus is tallied in a T matrix of dimension I × J and uses the following
convention:






0, Sensor i not associated with filter j







T(i, j) = 
0, χ∗[i, j] < χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi ), No Fault, H0










1, χ∗[i, j] > χ2 (1 − α/2, M × Zi ), Fault, H1
Figure 6.5 shows the relationship between I sensors and J subfilters required for “fault
consensus“ sensor exclusion. The rows correspond to the i = 1...I sensors and the columns
correspond to the j = 1...J subfilters. Each row contains measurements, Z[i] , and the
measurement error covariance matrix, R[i] , from the ith sensor. Each column contains the
estimated measurement, ẑ[i, j] , and its error covariance matrix, Pẑẑ [i, j] .
Based on the stated convention, a fault is declared when T contains a single nonzero
entry (i.e. at least one subfilter detected H1 ). After a fault is declared, SAARM waits for
a consensus from the remaining subfilters until a single fault-free subfilter remains. It is
assumed that the last remaining fault-free subfilter is the one which does not contain the
faulty sensor. After fault exclusion, the fault-free subfilter is elevated to “main filter” status
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and the pre-update residual monitoring epoch is restarted with I − 1 total sensors and J − 1
subfilters. Each newly spawned subfilter now contains I − 2 sensors. The faulty sensor
is removed from monitoring mode and follows the state diagram shown in Figure 6.2. Of
note, SAARM is able to detect the occurrence of multiple simultaneous faults but is not
able to provide simultaneous fault exclusion with the minimum quantity of I = J subfilters.
For SAARM to properly handle multiple simultaneous faults, multiple layers of
subfilters are required. The number of concurrent subfilters, JN , required to handle N
simultaneous faults for I sensors is:
!
I
I!
=
JN =
N!(I − N)!
I−N

(6.34)

As one might expect, the subfilter (and processing) requirements to guarantee resiliency to
multiple faults is non-trivial. For example, an 8 sensor system resilient to 2 simultaneous
faults (occuring within the same pre-residual monitoring epoch) requires 28 concurrent
SAARM subfilters!
As a result of the uncorrupted subfilter guarantee provided by the ARMAS framework
for a single simultaneous fault (within a monitoring epoch), SAARM is able to provide a
similar guarantee for all-source position integrity. The previously stated fault exclusion
axiom is extended: assuming at least one of the subfilters is informed entirely by
properly modeled, uncorrupted sensors, then at least one subfilter contains consistent state
estimation error statistics [44]. This means that the probabilistic union of the position
covariance estimates of all subfilters contains the true navigation state within the statistical
significance of the fault detection tests.
In summary, SAARM provides all-source sensor FDE and integrity for three different
types of serial sensor faults. To provide resiliency to a single fault, ARMAS is required to
instantiate and maintain a quantity of subfilters equal to the quantity of all-source sensors.
A separate main filter is maintained strictly for user output. Fault identification is based on
a sequence of χ∗ statistical tests of pre-update measurement residuals. Fault exclusion is
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based on a subfilter consensus approach which is tallied in a novel T matrix. A technique is
introduced to provide resiliency to multiple simultaneous faults at the expense of factorial
growth in the required quantity of concurrent estimation filters. Lastly, SAARM provides
a method for all-source position integrity via the union of all subfilter position covariance
estimates. This integrity concept is based on the assumption that the framework is able to
maintain at least one uncorrupted subfilter.
6.3.2

Stable Observability Monitoring (SOM).

The previous section summarized the ARMAS framework and the SAARM algorithm
used to perform fault detection, exclusion, and integrity functions. The framework requires
overlapping state observability to perform each of these functions. As previously stated,
the framework’s basic goal is to maintain at least one subfilter which is never corrupted by
a faulty sensor. This is required to maintain navigation estimation consistency and provide
a method for all-source integrity. The following section describes a method to accomplish
this within the monitoring mode of ARMAS. Clearly, understanding the process noise,
measurement noise, and measurement model are key to assessing the observability of a
system state variable. Introduced in 2021, SOM provides a measure of state estimate
observability in the form of a scalar and is used to directly quantify the observability of
a state-variable. SOM augments SAARM and resides in the ‘M’ monitoring mode block
in Figure 6.2. Since the ARMAS framework assumes state observability for both FDE and
integrity, it is critical that a method for monitoring real-time position state observability is
implemented.
SAARM requires overlapping position observability across all layer 1 subfilters
to perform consistent FDE operations and guarantee the preservation of at least one
uncorrupted subfilter for position integrity.

For SAARM to guarantee position state

observability at the layer 1 subfilter level, an additional layer of subfilters is required
(Figure 6.3). The purpose of this layer is to provide a means for observability analysis
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one layer deeper than the decision-making FDE layer to maintain resiliency to a single
simultaneous sensor fault (within a single monitoring epoch). The uncorrupted subfilter
guarantee provided by the ARMAS framework for a single simultaneous fault enables
SAARM to extend a similar guarantee for all-source position integrity [44]. SOM allows
the following extension of the previously stated fault exclusion axiom:
Assuming at least one of the subfilters is informed entirely by properly modeled,
uncorrupted sensors, then at least one subfilter contains consistent state
estimation error statistics [44]. If the states of interest in each layer 2 subfilter
are observable and stabilizable, then each layer 1 subfilter inherits these
properties.
Assuming no more than one simultaneous sensor failure, this means that the physical region
encompassed by the position covariance estimates of all layer 1 subfilters contains the true
navigation state within the statistical significance of the fault detection tests.
SOM records and monitors the post-update position covariances in each n = [1...N]
layer 2 subfilter in the observability bank. An observability flag Ok is set for layer 2 subfilter
n for tk according to





[n] + 
[n] +


1,
if
tr
P
(t
)
>
tr
P
(t
)
β
pos
pos

k
k−M







[n] + 
Ok,pos (n) = 
1,
if
tr
P
(t
)
>
tr
P

pos,max
pos
k









0, otherwise

(6.35)

+
where P[n]
pos (tk ) is the most recent post-update position covariance matrix for layer 2 subfilter
+
n, P[n]
pos (tk−M ) is the post-update position covariance matrix for layer 2 subfilter n exactly

M samples prior to tk P pos,max is a user-defined limit for maximum steady-state position
state estimate covariance, and β ∈ [1, ∞) is the state estimate covariance transient growth
threshold. The trace is the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix Pk , which represent
+ 
variances of the system state estimates. If the tr P[n]
pos (tk ) converges, then the individual
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position estimate variances also converge. When applying (6.35), it is important to ensure
units are identical across the grouped states.
To maintain resilience to a sensor failure, a user prompt to augment ARMAS with an
additional sensor is triggered if at least a single layer 2 subfilter observability test sets to
1 (6.36). The newly added sensor will directly enter monitoring mode if it is considered
‘trusted’ or must pass through sensor validation if ‘untrusted’.



PN



if n=1
Ok (n) > 0

true,
S OMCollaborate = 





 f alse, otherwise

(6.36)

where N is the quantity of layer 2 subfilters. Once a new sensor is successfully added into
ARMAS monitoring mode, each layer 2 subfilter gains another sensor. The results of (6.36)
are ignored until the newly requested sensor completes an ARMAS monitoring epoch. If
post update variance stability is regained, then (6.36) will set to 0 for each stable layer 2
subfilter and the observability warning is rescinded. This method flags the presence of an
information deficiency with respect to the estimated states of interest in real-time. Due
to potentially variable navigation state information available from all-source navigation
sensors, it is critical that ARMAS is always “aware” of when it lacks enough information
to maintain consistency.
6.3.3

Estimator Credibility Analysis.

Estimator performance is always dependent on available measurements [56]. Accordingly, estimators should be compared using the same data set which is sufficiently large to
provide statistically significant results. At first glance, position mean-squared error (MSE)
appears to be a simple, practical performance metric to compare different estimators. For
n total measurements, the bias e
x of state estimate b
x at time i is shown by (6.37). The MSE
of e
x is shown by (6.38).
e
xi = xi − b
xi

(6.37)

1 T
x e
xi
MS E = e
n i

(6.38)
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Although easily understandable, this definition of MSE only provides information about
the first moment of estimation error. Estimators also maintain a self-assessment of the
second moment of estimation error, known as the error covariance P. The Normalized
Estimation Error Squared (NEES) metric, i , is chi-square distributed, assumes Gaussian
errors, and provides a quantitative assessment of the estimator’s credibility from pessimistic
to optimistic [18]. NEES is calculated according to Eq. 6.39.
γi = (xi − b
xi )T Pi−1 (xi − b
xi )

(6.39)

For an m-dimensional state estimate with n total measurements, the Average NEES is
shown by Eq. 2.56.
n

γ=

1 X
γi
nm i=1

(6.40)

NEES represents the square of the distance between the state estimate b
x and the truth
x, normalized by the error covariance P.

Average NEES can be interpreted as a

uni-dimensional average of this squared distance. Average NEES quantifies estimator
credibility by assessing the accuracy of employed assumptions [18]. If the Average NEES
is near 1, then the estimator is likely credible. If the Average NEES is much less (greater)
than 1, it is pessimistic (optimistic).
6.4

Methods for Managing Cross-Correlated Information
For the purposes of this discussion, we define a collaborative exchange as a transaction

between a single requesting recipient and a single cooperative donor. We must be careful
when fusing collaborative sensor data because it can result in dependency between state
estimates and measurements if a relative measurement is later re-used without taking
historical dependencies into account.

This problem is called double-counting [41].

Distributed networks are scalable and resilient to changes in topology but are particularly
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vulnerable to this problem. If dependencies are not properly managed, the estimator can
become inconsistent by overestimating available sensor information and eventually diverge.
Additionally, sensor corruption is likely detected a posteriori, especially in distributed
networks. The reason for this is that the source of the corruption is often unknown until
the distributed statistical tests detect it. At this point, a method to decorrelate corrupted
information is required to preserve consistency. Since Bayesian estimation incorporates
historical measurements, we must maintain a fault-resistant architecture which contains
estimators never corrupted to eliminate the corrupted historical dependencies and recover
consistency.
There are known approaches to manage the double-counting problem and the a
posteriori consistency recovery problems. The following section analyzes the Covariance
Intersection and the distributed Interleaved Update Algorithm. The section concludes with
an introduction to the novel Split Approach designed to manage cross-correlation in a faultresistant collaborative network.
6.4.0.1

Covariance Intersection Method.

The limitations of managing unknown cross-correlation between state estimates and
measurements in decentralized estimation with arbitrary network topologies are widely
known. A rudimentary fix for this involves increasing Bayesian estimator process noise
to account for unmodelled dependencies between measurements and the state estimate.
This strategy leads to increased state estimate covariance and degradation in overall
estimator performance. This motivated the CI method [41][40] which fuses the probability
densities of two measurements with unknown cross-correlation into a consistent covariance
estimate. The CI technique is recommended as a good estimator for highly cross-correlated
measurements. The CI method utilizes a conservative estimate of Pab to guarantee estimator
consistency. Although the CI method is a conservative solution for the double-counting

166

problem, a primary downside for our application is the inability to recover previously fused
information in the event of a sensor corruption discovered a posteriori.
6.4.0.2

Interleaved Update (IU) Algorithm.

The IU algorithm [7] provides a multi-filter approach to the inconsistency problem.
This algorithm retains consistency by maintaining separable state estimates xi and
covariance estimates Pi for collaborative offboard measurements.

For example, the

covariance matrices associated with vehicles i, j are assembled in a block diagonal matrix
Pi,j (t) as shown in (6.41).

 P (t)
0
 i
Pi,j (t) = 
 0
P j (t)







(6.41)

The timestamp of the most recent measurement update from each vehicle is maintained
in a Ti matrix where each row q represents a filter and each column i represents an
offboard vehicle number. Row 1 in Ti corresponds to the set of states which has never
been updated by an offboard range measurement. All filters are always updated by onboard
measurements.
Each time a collaborative measurement is broadcast from vehicle i to another vehicle,
it contains current copies of xi , Pi , and Ti . With these parameters, the receiving vehicle
j always has access to a state estimate and covariance which have only been updated by
sensors on the transmitting vehicle i. This uncorrelated information can be used by vehicle
j without inconsistency.
A vehicle i receives a broadcast from vehicle j containing information Xj , Pj , and Tj
to update filter q onboard vehicle i. If information from vehicles other than j is present, the
optimal combination of filter information is selected for fusion by examining the trace of
the fused covariance estimate Pqi . The combination of filter information that results in the


argmin trace(Pqi ) is used to update filter q onboard vehicle i.
The IU algorithm requires each vehicle to maintain 2n simultaneous Kalman filters.
The author speculated that 30 unique vehicle IDs are attainable with this framework [7].
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Exponential scalability is highly undesirable, especially for multi-filter residual monitoring
algorithms like ARMAS [70]. Even so, the idea of retaining a proprioceptive solution
uncorrupted by offboard collaboration is a great insurance policy which enables eventual
recovery to autonomy from collaboration.
6.4.0.3

Split Approach (aka Stingy Collaboration).

If each vehicle maintains two parallel instances of ARMAS-SOM, one collaborative
and the other proprioceptive, then we can completely eliminate double-counting and
simultaneously mitigate the possibility of propagating corrupt donor data across the
network. For example, if a single unknowingly corrupted donor shares their proprioceptive
navigation solution with a recipient, the collaborative instance of ARMAS-SOM on
the recipient’s vehicle is already propagating a subfilter which never contained any
measurements from the corrupted donor.
For example, a single wingman in a 5-vehicle collaborative network unknowingly
broadcasts corrupted proprioceptive donor information to all vehicles (Figure 6.4). Since
each wingman’s collaborative estimation framework is propagating a subfilter “No
Wingman 3” which excludes any measurements from Wingman 3, a single FDE event is
required to remove all historical contributions from Wingman 3. Throughout this process,
Wingman 3 is able to receive consistent proprioceptive donor information from the other
networked vehicles which facilitates FDE actions onboard Wingman 3 to recover from the
fault.
With the stabilization guarantee afforded by SOM, the ARMAS-SOM framework will
detect the faulty donor and exclude them from the donor’s navigation solution [25]. In
other words, a single fault detection and exclusion action is required by the recipient to
eliminate all inconsistencies resulting from the donor. Although this approach does not
glean the maximum quantity of information from the network, it significantly maximizes
efficent use of network resources, lowers the risk of repeatedly propagating inconsistent
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information, and provides a mechanism to eliminate the faulty information completely.
Lastly, this approach can be used to prioritize high-fidelty donors over less desirable ones.

If more than one donor vehicle is corrupted (i.e. we violate the single simultaneous
failure assumption), the recipient vehicle can revert to the proprioceptive instance of
ARMAS-SOM which completely eliminates any possibility of offboard corruption. This
is particularly important because ARMAS-SOM must always maintain at least one
uncorrupted subfilter to guarantee consistency. Figure 6.5 shows the structural similarities
T matrices used in the proprioceptive and collaborative framework instances. If the donors
shared collaborative solutions which contained contributions from other corrupted donor
vehicles, an exponentially scaled approach like the IU Algorithm above would be required
to back-track and sort out how to fuse the information without loss of consistency. This split
approach is useful as an insurance policy to regain autonomous navigation by eliminating
all contributions from other vehicles.
6.5

Guidelines for Collaborative All-Source Navigation

We offer the following guidelines for collaborative all-source navigation:
• The key to integrity is the ability to maintain at least one consistent estimator.
• Inconsistency can result from on-board corruption, off-board corruption, or by
double-counting off-board information.
• Employ a scalable architecture to fuse collaborative information in a manner which
facilitates the recovery of consistency after fault detection.
• A proprioceptive filter is a great insurance policy.
6.6

Simulation
Consider a 3-D example in a local tangential (navigation) frame with five independent

distributed “wingmen” air vehicles at different formation location, each operating
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the ARMAS-SOM framework.

Each vehicle maintains split, parallel autonomous

(proprioceptive) and collaborative instances of ARMAS-SOM propagating 10-state EKFs
for position, velocity, acceleration, and GNSS clock bias states. The kinematics block is
defined by

 
 


 
 

ẋ p (t)  ẋv (t)   0 

 
 

ẋ(t) =  ẋv (t)  =  ẋa (t)  +  0 

 
 


 
  1

ẋa (t)
w(t)
− τa ẋv (t)

(6.42)

where x p is the vehicle’s position (m), xv is the vehicle’s velocity (m/s), xa is the vehicle’s
acceleration (m/s2 ), and τa = 300 seconds is a time-constant associated with a First-order
Gauss-Markov (FOGM) process. A 3D white noise process is given by w(t) where E[w(t)
w(t+τ)T ] = Qδ(τ) and
Q = (1.0 × 10−2 )2 I3×3 (m2 /s4 ).

(6.43)

Each vehicle is initialized with unique initial positions according to

T
x̂1 (0) = 0 0 3000 meters,

T
x̂2 (0) = −10000 3000 5000 meters,

T
x̂3 (0) = 10000 3000 5000 meters,

T
x̂4 (0) = −10000 −3000 2000 meters,

T
x̂5 (0) = 10000 −3000 2000 meters.
Each vehicle is initialized with identical state error covariance matrices according to


Pn (0) = diag 202 202 202 102 102 102 0.012 0.012 0.012 80002 .

(6.44)

Each aircraft receives discrete measurements from a constellation of 5 stationary satellite
vehicles (SV). The constellation is uniformly distributed in azimuth and simulates favorable
coverage with elevation angles between approximately 45 degrees and 63.4 degrees. Each
170

vehicle is equipped with dual-frequency GNSS receivers receiving simulated pseudorange
measurements from 5xL1 (1575 MHz), and 5xL2 (1227 MHz) SVs.
Individual pseudorange measurements are performed according to (6.45)
ρi =

p
(XS V,i − Xu ) + (YS V,i − Yu ) + (ZS V,i − Zu ) + bu

(6.45)

where ρi is the pseudorange to SV i, with fixed coordinates (XS V , YS V , ZS V ), estimated
user coordinates are (Xu , Yu , Zu ), and an estimated GNSS receiver clock bias is bu . The
pseudorange measurement covariance is RS V = 102 m2 . A receiver clock bias bu is
independently estimated as an additional state in each EKF. Each vehicle is able to augment
with collaborative ranging measurements from nearby wingmen according to
Rj =

p
(Xwng, j − Xr ) + (Ywng, j − Yr ) + (Zwng, j − Zr ).

(6.46)

where R j is a simulated radar range to Wingman j with actual coordinates (Xwng , Ywng , Zwng )
and with actual recipient coordinates (Xr , Yr , Zr ). Unlike the GNSS sensors, no ephemeris
is available, so estimated recipient and wingman solutions are fused with (6.46) to form
the measurement update. The main solution from the user’s collaborative instance of
ARMAS-SOM provides the estimated user location and covariance. The wingman’s
proprioceptive instance of ARMAS-SOM is used to provide the estimated wingman
location and associated position covariance. The ranging measurement covariance is
RWING = 102 m2 . Collaborative updates are performed only in the collaborative instance
of ARMAS-SOM for each recipient. Clock synchronization is assumed for collaborative
measurements. Vehicles are equipped with simulated alternative visual navigation sensors
which provide noisy velocity updates with RV IS NAV = (102 )I3×3 (m/s)2 . All sensors provide
measurement updates at 1Hz. SOM a posteriori state estimate covariance parameters are
set to β = 5 and P j,max = (25m)2 × 3 = 6889m2 . The vehicles travel at approximately 75
meters/second in the +Y direction in a local tangential reference frame for a total of 27
minutes (1620 seconds) of run time.
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The simulation is divided into 4 separate regions (Figure 6.6):
1. Permissive (0-5km)
2. L1 Jamming (5-50km)
3. L1 Jamming + Single Pseudorange L2 Spoofing (50km-100km)
4. Permissive (100km - End of Sim)
All five aircraft initialize with 5 × L1 trusted pseudorange sensors, 5 × L2 trusted
pseudorange sensors, and trusted 1 × V IS NAV sensor in region 1 at T = 0 seconds. Once
“WNG1” enters region 2 at T = 60 seconds, all vehicles encounter L1 noise jamming and
pare down to 5 × L2 pseudorange sensors and 1 × V IS NAV sensor.
In region 2, ARMAS-SOM detects a threat to resilience and each vehicle selectively
validates untrusted individual offboard collaborators until the observability warnings are
rescinded. Each donor vehicle shares its proprioceptive solution according to the split
“stingy collaboration” approach described in section 6.4.0.3 and each recipient vehicle
performs a collection period to ensure measurement residuals are valid for acceptance.
Each vehicle augments with approximately 2-3 collaborative relationships prior to entering
region 3. Once “WNG1” enters region 3 at T = 660 seconds, all vehicles experience an
insidious pseudorange bias on L2S AT 4 which initializes at 10 meters and grows at 10 m/s.
Once each vehicle detects the growing pseudorange bias and determines the
culprit, L2S AT 4 is excluded from each ARMAS-SOM instance. In response to the
L2S AT 4 exclusion, ARMAS-SOM detects a threat to resilience and forms an additional
collaborative relationship to stabilize (See Figure 6.7). The vehicles transition into region
4 at T = 1320 seconds where L1 jamming and L2 spoofing end. Once each vehicle’s
proprioceptive ARMAS-SOM instances re-establish resilience, then the collaborative
relationships are removed and the vehicles gracefully regain autonomy.

172

6.7

Numerical Results
The results of the first simulation show that ARMAR-SOM’s stingy collaboration

scheme stabilizes the all-source Guaranteed Position Zone (GPZ) during jamming and
spoofing events as shown in Figure 6.7. A comparison of the GPZ dimensions for both
the proprioceptive and collaborative ARMAS-SOM instances is shown in Figure 6.8. This
shows that the SOM algorithm sufficiently augments itself using collaboration to stabilize
the all-source position integrity solution during the combined navigation anomalies. Since
the GPZ is a visualization of the union of the FDE layer solutions, this is proof that
observability layer stabilization is inherited by the FDE and main layer. The end result
of this contribution is guaranteed resilience to a single simultaneous failure for 81% of the
total simulation time versus only 5% for a non-collaborative ARMAS instance.
Figure 6.9 shows estimator credibility results in the form of NEES for each wingman.
The mean results for 3D RSS Error and NEES are visible in Table 6.1. Stingy collaboration
resulted in a 11.3% mean reduction in RSS error across all vehicles for the duration of
the simulation. Average NEES for both the proprioceptive and collaborative instances
across all vehicles were 0.92 and 0.90, respectively. This shows that “stingy” collaboration
preserves consistent estimation while mititgating the risk of undesired error propagation
and avoiding the double-counting problem normally associated with unknown crosscorrelation.

6.8

Chapter Summary and Future Work
This research presented the motivation for collaborative all-source navigation and

covered a brief background on the fundamental concepts required to understand the resilient
ARMAS-SOM framework.

We explained how SOM provides intrinsic information

awareness for timely selective collaboration to preserve estimator consistency with the
assumption of a single simultaneous sensor failure. We introduced a novel split structure
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Instance

Veh. 1

Veh. 2

Veh. 3

Veh. 4

Veh. 5

Grand
Mean

Proprioceptive

9.86

13.39

9.90

11.13

9.52

10.76

8.89

10.39

8.37

10.82

9.22

9.54

0.94

1.16

0.74

0.98

0.78

0.92

0.88

1.04

0.69

1.10

0.81

0.90

Mean RSS Error (m)
”Stingy” Collaborative
Mean RSS Error (m)
Proprioceptive
ANEES
”Stingy” Collaborative
ANEES
Table 6.1: Comparison of Proprioceptive and Collaborative ARMAS-SOM Instances

which maintains both “stingy” collaborative and proprioceptive frameworks to maximize
efficient use of network resources, limit the propagation of unknown corruption to a
single donor, donor prioritization, and eliminate double counting normally associated with
recursive Bayesian fusion of collaborative information. We also demonstrated how the
same intrinsic information awareness used by SOM can be used to determine when it
is safe to transition back to autonomy from collaboration. This structure demonstrated
effective stabilization of the all-source GPZ integrity solution, a 11% reduction in RSS
error, preservation of consistent estimation, and the ability to gracefully recover autonomy.
Follow on work in this area involves lab testing with real sensors with the eventual goal of
flight test.

174

Layer0

Layer1

Layer2

St
abl
e
Faul
t
Us
erOut
put Det
er
vabi
l
i
t
y
ect
i
on Obs
t
or
i
ng
& Excl
us
i
on Moni
Si
ngl
eMai
n
Fi
l
t
e
r

I‘
c
hoos
e
’2
I‘
c
hoos
e
’1
queFi
l
t
e
r
s
Uni
queFi
l
t
e
r
s Uni

Is
e
ns
or
s

e
ns
or
se
ac
h
I-1s
e
ns
or
se
ac
h I-2s

Figure 6.3: ARMAS Monitoring Mode with User Output Layer 0, Fault Detection and
Exclusion Sub-Layer 1, and Observability Sub-Layer 2 for Stable Observability Monitoring
(SOM)
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Figure 6.4: Stingy Collaboration Example: Wingman 1 receives corrupted collaborative
donor information from Wingman 3. A single fault detection and exclusion action is
required to remove all historical contributions from Wingman 3.
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Figure 6.5: Collaborative ARMAS T matrix: Collaborative information (gray) is used to
augment proprioceptive information (white). This forms the T matrix structure for the
collaborative all-source framework which is fused into a single main filter for user output.
A parallel proprioceptive instance is maintained separately.
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Figure 6.7: Combined Overhead and Profile View of WNG1 Split Collaborative “GPZ-C”
and Proprioceptive “GPZ-P” ARMAS-SOM Instances with individual Layer 1 Subfilter
Solutions at T = 13m 19s (T = 799s) inside the L1 Jamming + L2 Spoofing Region 3
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Figure 6.8: Size Comparison of Split “Stingy” Collaborative and Proprioceptive All-source
Guaranteed Position Zones for WNG1 in GNSS Regions 1-4
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Figure 6.9: Estimator Credibility Comparison for Split Collaborative and Proprioceptive
Instances of ARMAS-SOM for 5 Vehicles
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VII.

Summary and Conclusions

As we learned, the United States’ need for resilient PNT is congruous across agencies
responsible for domestic infrastructure (e.g. DHS, CISA) and national defense (e.g. DoD,
USAF, USA, USN). Executive Order 13905 “Strengthening National Resilience Through
Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services” [1] made this a clear
national priority. The 2030 United States Air Force Science and Technology Strategy [36]
expressed a strategic challenge to obtain a mix of capable, trustworthy, autonomous systems
that can perform as part of a collaborative system to provide synergistic, multi-domain
effects. With this in mind, this research presented methods for collaborative all-source
navigation and real-time autonomous guidance for single and multi-vehicle cooperative
navigation in GNSS-denied environments. The unifying goal of these pursuits is to increase
the reliability and trustworthiness of collaborative PNT for critical domestic infrastructure
and defense capabilities.
Chapter 3 contributed a real-time heuristic method of trajectory generation for a single
aircraft to minimize relative positioning error in a wireless sensor network composed of
a simulated formation of maneuvering aircraft. This control scheme, SAS, was based
on a compact, scalable particle swarm to locally optimize a pluggable cost function in
real-time. Chapter 4 presented a distributed real-time swarm control scheme with the
introduction of the SCANS algorithm. SCANS demonstrated real-time swarm control
for importance-weighted navigation support. This effort built on the concept of greedy
local optimization of globally convex cost surfaces (proven in Chapter 3) to demonstrate
consensus-like behavior.
Chapter 5 contributed a definition and assessment of a position state observability
margin which provided intrinsic navigation state awareness missing from ARMAS.
The combined framework resulting from this contribution became known as ARMAS-
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SOM and enabled the demonstration of resilient all-source navigation through proactive
augmentation of navigation state observability. The intrinsic information awareness also
indicated when it was safe to break collaborative information links and transition back to
autonomy. Chapter 6 introduced a novel “stingy collaboration” framework which built on
the resilient fault detection and exclusion, online calibration, and remodeling of ARMASSOM. Stingy collaboration demonstrated resilient all-source navigation with integrity in
a complex collaborative 3-D simulation. In summary, we offer the following guidelines
gleaned from this collaborative all-source navigation research:
• The key to navigation integrity is the ability to maintain at least one consistent
estimator.
• Inconsistency can result from on-board corruption, off-board corruption, or by
double-counting off-board information.
• Employ a scalable architecture to fuse collaborative information in a manner which
facilitates the recovery of consistency after fault detection.
• A proprioceptive filter is a great insurance policy.
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